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 This dissertation connects theories of political communication, public 
relations and international relations to conceptualize a new model of public diplomacy, 
where boundaries between distinct types of actors are drawn. It proposes an ecological 
model and a competition model of public diplomacy. Based on these conceptual models, 
it empirically supports the academic rationalization of governmental interference in 
foreign media effects among its domestic citizens: Using a quota sample of 560 survey 
respondent from mainland China, the empirical part of the dissertation illustrated: 1. 
Governmental control on foreign media accessibility has significant effects on perceived 
media credibility and thus dependency on it; 2. Availability of domestic media resource 
negatively impacts dependency on foreign media; and 3. Foreign media and domestic 
media, as currently conceptualized, have distinct effects on the psychological activeness 
of Chinese publics to speak out against social issues.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
The advancement of communication technologies has enabled governments to 
interact with people in other countries. For either international collaboration or 
international competition, governments became interested in communicating with foreign 
people because they want to build better national image, facilitate international trade, 
increase the clarity of their foreign policy; sometimes, governments communicate with 
foreign activist groups to destabilize an administration, or reduce rival countries’ 
bargaining power in negotiation.  
With examples of international broadcasting plans and public diplomacy 
campaigns preceding this dissertation, it examines and compares different channels of 
activating foreign publics through international media. It focuses on the importance of 
people’s perception of the credibility of the communication channel and information 
source. Moreover, it studies how governmental media influence its people preemptively 
to reduce the effect of foreign public diplomacy. This means that governments are 
looking forward to the establishment of an academic rationalization of the defensive 
domestic extension of public diplomacy. 
The first chapter serves as an introduction to the dissertation and will briefly 
summarize the content and the design of this research. Key terms will be introduced in 
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order to help the reader to get a better conceptualization of the research theme and 
objective. The following sections include:  an introduction to the public diplomacy 
model; an introduction to the dis-accreditation of foreign media model; and an 
introduction to the general structure of the dissertation.  
1.1 Public Diplomacy, Public Relations and Foreign Publics Activation 
In public relations theory, people who have a direct or indirect association with 
the organization is called “publics”, and there are four types of them: non-publics, latent 
publics, aware publics and active publics. Organizations around the world try to 
harmonize their surrounding environment by understanding, communicating and 
influencing the publics, sometimes this includes activating latent publics to generate 
debate, or deactivating publics for crisis management.  
 Governments are essentially organizations, and as they want to do the same thing 
with its people and foreign publics, scholars and practitioners call this particular type of 
public relations practice “public diplomacy”. Similarly, an important function of the 
practice of public diplomacy is turning foreign publics from latent publics into active 
publics. Research shows that the Arab Spring movement is an example of outside 
management of public awareness about “Democracy”, the Color Revolution among 
former Soviet states can also be attributed to active engagement of foreign public 
diplomacy activities.  
However, public diplomacy is far more than incitation campaigns or 
psychological campaigns for political purposes. Of course, public diplomacy includes 
these propagandist activities, where government power overrides the foreign publics who 
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were persuaded or incited. But it also includes more ethical and bilateral methods of 
understanding and communicating with foreign people. One example was the campaign 
about air pollution in China by the US embassy in Beijing. It not only turned the Chinese 
publics into active publics against over-industrialization and pollution, but also educated 
the foreign publics, benefitted US government’s credibility, and Chinese’s perception of 
US’ reliability.  
Some may argue that the air pollution case can hardly be called a deliberate public 
diplomacy campaign: the whole national debate around air pollution, PM 2.5, PM 10 
(criteria of air quality measurement) started from a routine report of air quality done by 
the US embassy in Beijing. But its consequential success in activating Chinese awareness 
and communication about the issue has been phenomenal. The reason is that the issue 
relates to the Chinese people’s personal health, and it showed US government’s concern 
in a neutral and credible way, and the communication was largely happening on social 
media, ensuring a reactive and two-way communication strategy.  
This dissertation studies how such successful case could be replicated by starting 
with the right step: researching and understanding the target publics. The results of this 
dissertation show what are the psychological components that drive foreign publics into 
active communication about an issue. More importantly, it compares how these 
psychological components interrelate through different information channels (e.g. direct 
US media, social media, target government media, and US media quoted by target 
government media). In general, this dissertation answered these questions: 
“What is the most effective information channel to activate foreign publics?” 
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“How important is the credibility of these channels in activating foreign publics?” 
1.2 Restricting Foreign Influence: Introduction and Assumptions 
However public diplomacy is conceptualized or defined, it is a certain type of 
diplomacy. This means that it is building relationship and negotiating over an issue with 
foreign entities. Public diplomacy fundamentally means the existence of foreign 
influence in a certain country, and not all countries welcome foreign influence. Examples 
about governments expressing their concerns about the existence of foreign media, 
foreign products, and even the use of foreign language are countless. In modern times, 
governments sometimes accuse each other for building relationship with their domestic 
activists, who are a potential political threat to national stability and security.  
In certain government types where power is more centralized, government may 
easily restrict the incoming flow of foreign persuasive information, or the activities of 
foreign public diplomats. Russia, for example, has announced that it would block radio 
broadcasting of Voice of America, and several countries blocked online access to Wall 
Street Journal, New York Times, or CNN. However, as the global information network 
became increasingly difficult to block, these governments started to understand the 
importance of consolidating internal relationship with their domestic publics (the people). 
Relationships are resources, thus one way to consolidate internal relationship is to 
discredit foreign sources of information thus weakening the relationship between 
domestic publics with foreign organizations. 
China is a perfect example of the above-mentioned strategies. In 2002, new 
policies prohibited any broadcasting of foreign cartoon, TV series, or movies on 
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primetime Chinese TV. In consecutive years, the access to Western social media started 
to be restricted. In recent years, the Chinese authorities promoted the idea of Western 
media bias and the construction of a new Chinese worldview and common Chinese 
dream.  
The current dissertation holds no ethical or moral responsibility, ability and 
intention to judge the morals of governmental policies. Rather, it tends to illustrate and 
study the simple fact the governments can adopt defensive strategies against other 
countries’ relationship building process with its people. Now, given the fact that some 
countries have far more powerful and extensive information networks and global media 
than others (Fuchs, 2010), let us imagine a dyadic relationship where one country is 
the acting country and other is the receiving country of public diplomacy, and let us 
assume that national/governmental image and the image of that country’s media are 
positively connected, and their action are coordinated. Then, as a continuation of the 
first part of this dissertation, it also studies and seeks to answer the following questions:  
“How can the receiving countries discredit foreign channels of information?” 
“How effectively can they discredit different types of foreign channels?” 
“How effectively can they deactivate the publics preemptively?” 
1.3 Structure of the Dissertation 
Although the current chapter is only an introduction, it only serves as a teaser to 
give general outlines and to inspire interest. It means that the key conceptualization of the 
underlying mechanism of the above mentioned dyadic relationship will be explained in 
detail in Chapter II. Chapter II’s purpose is to establish an analytical framework and 
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conceptual mechanism with which the later analysis could make sense. Without 
understanding to how public diplomacy works theoretically, how public diplomacy 
campaigns were conducted, and what were their results, it would be difficult to 
understand why this study is important and meaningful. Its results will benefit not only 
the field of international political communication and public relations, but also 
international broadcasting and international relations. This also means that Chapter II will 
serve as a “Literature Review” chapter that connects relevant research and cases from the 
above-mentioned fields.  
If one finds the mechanism of public diplomacy acceptable, and agrees that 
governments have intentions to activate foreign publics, Chapter III will layout a 
theoretical model of state moderation of foreign media credibility. Moreover, Chapter IV 
incorporates the notion of public segmentation into the study of public diplomacy: that is, 
it proposes a model that will empirically test the efficiency of foreign publics’ activations 
in different experimental scenarios. It is expected that such efficiency is dependent on the 
different information channels and different perceptions about the credibility of 
information sources. The efficiency will be measured in terms of general model fit 
indexes and the effect (coefficients) of antecedent variables on communicative behavior.  
It is important to note here that although Chapter II, III and IV all appears to be 
conceptualizations of theoretical frameworks, their scopes are very different. As 
mentioned before, Chapter II serves as the overarching literature review for the whole 
dissertation, which means that it does not bother with the proposal of actual measurement 
models, but will lay out the theoretical assumptions and conceptual models of public 
diplomacy. Chapter III and IV then follow up with actual measurement models that 
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examines only a part, or several links, inside the conceptual models of public diplomacy 
proposed in Chapter II. 
Chapter V serves as a discussion about analytical methods, which includes the 
justification of the choices of data collection and analysis methods.  After that, the 
dissertation will get into the results of empirical examination in Chapter VI, where the 
theoretical models proposed in Chapter III and Chapter IV are operationalized and 
examined with survey data.
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CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This chapter depicts the theoretical framework of the dissertation and it includes 
four main parts. Firstly, it introduces public diplomacy to the reader in terms of its 
definition in four different schools of thought. Secondly, it summarizes previous research 
and illustrates the problems of previous essentialist and functionalist approaches to public 
diplomacy. Thirdly, in a structuralist approach, which re-conceptualizes the three of the 
actors in public diplomacy: the state, the mediator and the people. Last but not the least, 
it explains the relationships between the different types of actors with a one-sided 
ecology model and a two-sided negotiation model.  
2.1 What is Public Diplomacy? 
The introduction of this dissertation has already showcased a few examples of 
public diplomacy. However, a few cases or examples are not enough to start the 
theoretical construction, for they cannot provide an accurate answer to the question “what 
is public diplomacy?” 
This is not an easy question, not even for public diplomacy researchers and 
practitioners. The actual business of public diplomacy is being practiced by media 
workers, government officials, advertisers of multinational corporations, NGOs’ outreach 
department, and so on. Not surprisingly, because a wide range of different industrial or 
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governmental entities practice public diplomacy, they asked this question (what is public 
diplomacy?) to a wide range of distinct academics. They include scholars from 
international relations, public relations, advertising, and mass communication. Although 
there are numerous ways to categorize public diplomacy, this section mainly focuses on 
the above-mentioned four areas of study.  
What is public diplomacy? The first answer was provided by a then retired 
foreign service officer, dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts 
University, Mr. Edmund Guillon, in 1965. His definition of public diplomacy can be 
traced in the documents of the Murrow Center of Public Diplomacy: 
“Public diplomacy... deals with the influence of public attitudes on the 
formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of 
international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by 
governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private 
groups and interests in one country with another; the reporting of foreign 
affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job 
is communication, as diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the 
process of intercultural communications” (Cull 2008, p. 17) 
Guillon’s definition focuses on foreign policies, international relations and foreign 
public opinion. In comparison to definitions by scholars from other disciplines, this 
definition is based on the essential interest in international relations, with special focus on 
who conducts public diplomacy and what public diplomacy can do for them in terms of 
international relations. 
For example, Malone (1985) defined public diplomacy as "direct communication 
with foreign peoples, with the aim of affecting their thinking and, ultimately, that of their 
governments". The definitions became more concrete in terms of actors and areas of 
influence later, as Tuch (1990) defined public diplomacy as "a government's process of 
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communication with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its 
nation's ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and 
policies.” Nye (2008), on the other hand, defined public diplomacy as a “tool through 
which a country’s soft power is exerted”. 
Public relations scholars have argued for theoretical convergence between 
international PR and public diplomacy. Signitzer and Coombs (1992) argued that most of 
the international PR literature studied how to effectively communicate with foreign 
publics for the benefits of multinational corporations, not for governments. They 
compared the basic theoretical components of public diplomacy and Grunig & Hunt’s 
(1984) typology of public relations models, and argued that the two field were “naturally 
converging”. Yun (2006) tested the applicability of the Excellence theory (Grunig, 1992) 
among diplomats from around the world in Washington, DC, and found supportive 
evidence: diplomats’ strategies of public diplomacy can be theoretically explained and 
categorized by the Excellence theory of public relations. Signitzer and Wamser (B. 
Signitzer & Wamser, 2006) argued that public diplomacy is a “specific government 
public relations function” (p.435), and that both public diplomacy and public relations are 
“strategic communication functions of either organizations or nation-states, and typically 
deal with the reciprocal consequences a sponsor and its publics have upon each other” 
(p.441). 
A different perspective can be found in advertising scholarship, which has 
addressed how nation branding or “brand states” played an important role in public 
diplomacy (Van Ham, 2001, 2002). In this sense, their approach to public diplomacy 
focuses on perception of governments among foreign publics and the consequences. 
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Scholars of nation branding do not usually define public diplomacy in their own terms, 
but mainly illustrated the association between public diplomacy and concepts such as 
place branding, nation branding or national image management. For example, Wang 
(2006a) argued that the management of a nation’s image abroad is a key component of 
public diplomacy. Van Ham (2002, 2003) argued that what citizen around the world think 
and feel about a state is vital to that state’s success. Such success includes gaining 
supportive voice, attracting tourism and investment and expanding exports of domestic 
products. The key takeaway from the advertising school is that they tried to directly link 
the practice of nation branding, or public diplomacy in general, with the “shift in political 
paradigms” from modern sense of geopolitics to postmodern competitions of symbols 
and images (Van Ham, 2002, p.252). In other word, advertising scholars advanced Nye’s 
(1990) concept of soft power into a more social-interaction, symbol- and emotion-based 
area of study. For example, Zhang (2006) conceptualized public diplomacy as  
“the active participation by nations in the construction of meanings, in 
which each nation is one of the many players in the international 
community that continually interacts through exchanging symbols, 
forming and negotiating meanings, and performing acts based on their 
respective meanings” (p.27) 
It is important to add an additional note here about the differences between the 
public relations approach and the advertising approach to public diplomacy. Although 
there are a number of concepts from both schools that may have similar meaning at face 
value. The public relations approach could be robust in conceptualizing public 
diplomacy: this is because that public relations includes various conceptualizations about 
power balances in the communication process: contemporary public relations scholars 
recognize the importance of gaining, maintaining, exerting and yielding power, while 
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advertising scholars are more goal-oriented and influenced by other schools such as 
marketing. The advertising approach to public diplomacy could be closer to propaganda 
campaigns, nations’ image building and incitation campaigns, while the public relations 
approach could be more useful for local relationship building, education programs and 
reputation management of governments and national leaders.  
The mass communication perspective on public diplomacy has the longest 
history. While PR focuses on relationship-building, nation branders focus on the 
emotional and affective outcomes of national image perception. Mass communication 
scholars are often not regarded as a legitimate member of the public diplomacy research 
community, for sometimes public diplomats hope to differentiate themselves from 
propagandists who engage in persuasion, dissemination of false information, and 
psychological warfare (Fitzpatrick, 2007; Nye, 2008). However, mass communication 
scholars’ focus on the relationships among media, public opinion and government is 
nevertheless valuable (Gilboa, 2008; Soroka, 2006). Most mass communication scholars 
also do not bother with the definition of public diplomacy, but their focus on the linkages 
among media frames, agendas, foreign public opinion and foreign government is unique. 
Mass communication scholars often come up with empirical models that explains how an 
international broadcasting system or internationalized social media, work as a mediator 
between governments and citizen (Entman, 2008; Golan & Himelboim, 2015). These 
models will be explained with more details later.  
To sum it up, scholars of international relations, public relations, advertising and 
mass communications all have their specific focus in public diplomacy. The way they 
conceptualize public diplomacy as an academic inquiry is different: international 
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relations scholars focuses more on the defining the actor (the government) and the 
expected outcome (ideals, policies), some of them even focuses on resources of public 
diplomacy (culture) (Nye, 1990) and the instrumentalization of public diplomacy in 
international relations (Nye, 2008). Mass communication scholars cling the most tightly 
to international relations in terms of conceptualization, but focuses on the relationships 
among media, government and public opinion, and are engaged more in empirical studies 
of foreign public opinion management. Public Relations scholars conceptualized public 
diplomacy as a government’s specific function of relationship management. And 
advertising scholars have their unique ways of conceptualizing public diplomacy and 
focuses on governments’ efforts in the creation and maintenance of national image. 
However, as shown in Figure 2.1, it is difficult to draw definite lines between their 
approaches to public diplomacy, their differences are not absolute, but rather lying on 
different spectra. 
 




2.2 The Existing Problems of Public Diplomacy Conceptualization. 
The previous section discussed the conceptualization of public diplomacy as a 
government practice in different academic fields. It summarizes these conceptualizations, 
the current conceptualizations of public diplomacy practice and relationships between 
different actors do not provide a clear answer to how to strategically analyze a single 
public diplomacy project.  
For example, the symbolic interactionist interpretation of public diplomacy 
provides a convenient perspective to study what scholars called “cultural diplomacy”, it 
has a focus on the collaborative work by global institutions in the creation, recreation and 
negotiation of symbols. However, it does not explain the structural order within such 
collaboration and in most cases, is only interested in the process and results of 
interactions. This means that the symbolic interactionist school does not explain which 
institution should complete which task and the corresponding responsibilities of different 
entities in a public diplomacy project.  
This is not to say that there is no normative theory in the study of public 
diplomacy. Public relations researchers have proposed several versions of a normative 
public diplomacy theory which incorporates public relations norms (Golan, 2013; 
Signitzer & Coombs, 1992; Grunig, 1993). Other scholars proposed normative theories of 




The Importance of Competition in Public Diplomacy. 
Many would argue that public diplomacy goes beyond the deliberate actions of 
governments in some cases. For example, the popularity of Hollywood movies can hardly 
be a direct result of US public diplomacy. Of course, symbolic interactionism again 
provides a convenient analytical perspective to study the influence of media products 
abroad. The public relations school would also turn its focus on the strategies of 
Hollywood movie companies’ strategy in promoting their products abroad. These are 
indeed useful and valuable perspectives, but they both ignore an important feature of 
mass communication: each human being’s energy in media consumption is limited to a 
certain extent, that means there is a fundamental competition between Hollywood 
movies, Bollywood movies, and other international cinema. To achieve the goal of 
gaining positive and supportive public opinion abroad, or to promote national culture and 
values, governments and culture promoters needs to compete in the market of ideas.  
Diplomacy means negotiation, and negotiation means there are competing ideas. 
But the advertising school focuses on a single-sided story of image creation and 
relationship building. Mass communication scholars do notice the competitive nature of 
international broadcasting. Scholars of media credibility studied “channel credibility 
competition” (Kiousis, 2001). And international communication studies include many 
comparative studies of different frames about international phenomena such as Eurozone 
crisis, KAL incident, global warming, etc.  Entman’s (2008) cascading activation model 
also observed frame contestation among US news frames and other countries’ news 
frames. His cascading activation model (explained in detail later) clarifies the functions 
of governments, media, elites and the mass public. However, this model was not 
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particularly clear in explaining the relationship between the US government and US-
owned global media: the US influence was simplified to “US news frames” as a foreign 
news source. 
The cascading activation model illustrated a point larger than the structuralist 
perspective it adopted: it showed that within each society there are relationships and 
mutual influences between the government, the opposing elites, the media and the citizen. 
The observation into the internal structure of a society is important for the practice of 
foreign public diplomacy. Because it means that a public diplomat has to look at not only 
channels and effects, but also other actors influencing those channels and effects. For 
example, if a person wants to travel from one point to another point, he/she has to 
consider the method of transportation, the landscape of the route and whether the 
destination is accessible. But practically, he/she also has to consider if there are too many 
cars in the designed route, the local regulations about travelling through that route and the 
driving habits of other drivers on the road.  
Scholars of mass communication and international relations noticed frame 
contestation and the differences of societal structures in different countries. For example, 
studies have shown that the relationships between media, government and public opinion 
are different from one society to another. Studies also examined and compared media 
credibility of different global media platforms for a particular population. Thus, there is 
knowledge about how differently governments manage public opinion, and how 
differently global media are perceived by people from distinct regions. But when such 
knowledge is applied in the study of public diplomacy, scholars often have different 
findings about the best management of public diplomacy. For example, scholars found 
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that a nation’s leader’s image is important in increasing friendly sentiments abroad, while 
others found that multinational corporations are the main players helped building 
relationships with foreign publics. In this case, it is important to set boundaries between 
different entities of public diplomacy.  
The Lack of Boundaries between Public Diplomacy Actors. 
Among the four major schools that study public diplomacy, the social-
interactionist approach is perhaps the most vanguard school of thought. With the 
emergence of Habermas’s concept of public sphere, and Castell’s elaboration of a new 
public sphere in the information age, scholars of public diplomacy were quick in applying 
a constructivist perspective: so that we see many studies about a “brand-state” is 
constructed by social interactions. With the rise of social media, the academic inquiry of 
public diplomacy has been slightly diverted to the focus on the diminishing boundaries 
between target audience, the global publics, the media, and powerful authorities. Some 
theories claim the spontaneity of the citizens, other theories focused on the functions of 
media platforms, some others focused on the influence of authoritative and governmental 
power in public diplomacy. With the many versions of categorization of untraditional 
diplomacy (Cull, 2008b; Gilboa, 2008; Golan, 2013; Wang, 2006b), scholars studying 
public diplomacy found different prototypes of diplomacy to the publics or diplomacy 
with the publics. These categorizations include public diplomacy, media diplomacy, 
cultural diplomacy, education diplomacy, international political marketing, international 
broadcasting, and so on.  
These types of untraditional diplomacy are distinguished from traditional 
diplomacy usually by a) assuming the actor is not a government; b) assuming the goal is 
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not policy change or persuasion; and c) assuming that the diplomacy is not done to/with 
another government. And those assumptions are usually rationalized because the special 
functions of social institutions in the process of untraditional diplomacy. For example, 
media diplomacy means the use of media to address foreign government officials (instead 
of global publics in general). As Gilboa noticed, her and other scholar’s work often make 
categorizations based on the different goals and means of nontraditional diplomacy.  
Golan, Yang, and Kinsey (2015) draw the boundaries between campaigns, public 
diplomacy and cultural diplomacy by looking at the time it would take for any effect. For 
example, they categorized them into short-term, mid-term and long-term projects to 
address foreign public opinion. This perspective is valuable as it provides a strategic 
focus on the actual practice of public diplomacy projects, but it still does not give a clear 
answer to the interrelated nature of public diplomacy actors. Gilboa (2008, p. 59) did a 
great job in introducing three models of public diplomacy based on the actors of public 
diplomacy and the relationship among them. The three models are respectively the Basic 
Cold War model, the Nonstate Transnational Model and the Domestic PR model.  
These models are extremely important for the current dissertation, because it not 
only explores the relationships among the state, the nonstate actors and the audience, but 
also provides a historical perspective in terms of the emergence of new players in public 
diplomacy. Rather than categorize the roles played by actors in a generic model, these 
models are separated because actors have different functions in each of the models and 
the relationships between them are different.  For example, Gilboa (2008) summarized:  
“The three models can explain significant variation in perceptions of 
public diplomacy activities. The Chinese government saw the 
prodemocracy demonstrations as American use of the Basic Cold War 
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model: the use of international broad casting to inspire public unrest in 
China. From the U.S. perspective, however, the prodemocracy campaign 
in China was an example of the Nonstate Transnational model: an 
opposition group in China using global communication to mobilize public 
opinion in the West to actively support their cause. Application of the 
models showed that the U.S. interpretation was the correct one…” p. 60 
However, the difference between the two models is, as Golan et al (2015) 
categorized, the difference between a short-term effect and a long-term effect. The actors 
involved in the prodemocracy demonstrations in China are just there despite of the 
observer’s preference: the opening-up policy of Chinese government in 1978, the import 
of Western goods, the broadcasting of Western media products and the westernization of 
Chinese education. The Chinese government, the US government, media of all kinds, 
international trade facilitators, students, universities are all part of the actors in that event. 
Simply categorizing a public diplomacy phenomenon as either a Basic Cold War model 
or a Nonstate Transnational model is too much simplification of the process. And such 
simplification will cause ignorance to the competitive nature of public diplomacy, as well 
as create confusion about the structural relationship between actors. 
 
The Analytical Problems Caused. 
Taking a famous question in public diplomacy as an example: in the case where a 
country’s peace keeping corps sendS financial aid using its naval forces’ vessels to 
another country, should this be considered public diplomacy or traditional diplomacy? 
And with regard to the reporting of this event in the global mass media, and its discussion 
in social media, should it be considered as media diplomacy, cultural diplomacy or 
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propaganda? Scholars studying soft power also ask whether this is hard power or soft 
power? 
Obviously, the use of naval forces’ vessels to transport international aid resources 
associates this action with a country’s military resources and economic resource. Its 
portrayal and discussion in media platforms may cause the action to have an effect in 
global public opinion. Thus, scholars can categorize the different aspects of this action 
into either international collaboration, traditional diplomacy, public diplomacy, media 
diplomacy and so on. That is, the major categorization of public diplomacy is drawn by 
looking at the intention of the immediate effect of any single actor in the whole event. 
This categorization has many merits, but it provides obstacles to analyze a relationship 
building/image promotion/diplomacy process taking all major actor into consideration at 
the same time (Baldwin, 2016).  
For example, studies have discussed the failure of American public diplomacy in 
the Middle East after 9-11 (The Shared Value Project), blaming the lack of credibility in 
the message, the misplaced objectives of media organizations even the poor design of 
messages (Plaisance, 2005; Wang, 2007). The focus on a single actor (the media and the 
design team) missed other players in the international public opinion arena: American 
military actions were not fully supported in the US, creating negative images in the US 
domestic media, political conflicts among world powers in the region also exacerbated 
local anti-American sentiments. Research tried to provide a cure for the problem but the 
majority of the analyses focused only on the decision-making process of the Public 
Information Office of the State Department (Gilboa, 2001; Snow & Taylor, 2008), the 
poor focus of the message delivered to the local people and the existence of Al Jazeera 
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(Powers & Gilboa, 2007). But few have asked the question: why Al Jazeera gained 
popularity? How were the locals communicating through non-Western local media? Was 
Al Jazeera similar to CNN or BBC in terms of its role in local society and its relationship 
with local governments? 
Because there were no clear boundaries between actors in public diplomacy, 
scholars could only image the relationships between them by guessing their role in local 
society (Wang, 2006a). Assuming media organizations to have the same function 
worldwide because they are “media” is too essentialist. For example, China Central 
Television is similar to CNN in many ways, but their resource of power and their social 
place in China and the US differs drastically. The upcoming section will provide new 
conceptualizations of actors in public diplomacy. In other words, it tries to draw clear 
boundaries between actors NOT according to their names, labels or functions in a special 
scenario, but their power resources, relationship with other actors and functions when 
connected to another actor.  
2.3 Rethinking Actors in Public Diplomacy: State, Mediator and Publics. 
As can be seen in Figure 2.1, different schools that study public diplomacy have 
distinct focus in terms of entities. This also means that they have different 
conceptualizations about the actors in public diplomacy. In mainstream theories of 
international relations, the emphasis is given primarily to states and non-state actors. 
Mass communication scholars and public opinion researchers would have a more 
narrowed-down focus on media platforms, election campaigns, elite organizations and 
opinion leaders. Advertising researchers focus more on symbols and multinational 
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corporations. And public relations scholars are more interested in activist groups, NGOs, 
NPOs and local communities. 
Some of these actors overlap in terms of what they stand for. These overlaps 
create difficulties for theoretical integration of public diplomacy, which requires the re-
organization or even the re-conceptualization of actors, relationships and goals. This 
dissertation categorizes different actors in public diplomacy into three groups: the state, 
the mediator and the publics. In this dissertation, the state refers to governments or 
governmental agencies that has the goal of influencing foreign public opinion and even 
behaviors of foreign people (e.g. Embassies, British Council). The mediator refers to 
organizations or platforms that the state collaborates with or utilizes to modify the effect 
of such influence (e.g. CNN, Olympic Games, WTO, Facebook, foreign agents). And the 
publics refers to (groups of) ordinary individuals who are subject to a particular goal of a 
foreign government.  
State actors in Camouflage. 
The definition of a state in the current dissertation needs to make clarifications to 
what should be considered as a government and, more importantly, a governmental 
agency. A government is defined as the complex of political institutions that performs 
governing and administration of a country and promotes its interests. In the context of 
public diplomacy, the definition of the state assumes that states have interests in 
influencing foreign public opinion and behaviors. Numerous governments have 
specialized departments that monitors and influences foreign public opinion, the U.S. 
government had the United States Information Agency (i.e. USIA) as the primary public 
diplomacy machinery. After a few failed attempts in altering anti-American sentiments in 
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the Arabic world (Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2003; Golan & Kiousis, 2010; Plaisance, 2005; 
Powers & El Gody, 2009), the USIA was put down. However, the Obama administration 
actually established numerous offices under the Public Information department that 
focused respectively on different regions in terms of foreign public opinion. The Chinese 
central government also promoted campaigns such the “Chinese Dream” starting 2014, 
and such campaign coordinated the efforts from the Unified Front Work Department, the 
Publicity Department of CPC, Ministry of Education and Ministry of Foreign Affairs1.  
There has been a plausible change in terms of governments’ use of official public 
diplomacy agency: both the US and China, together with Britain and France, are trying to 
avoid the establishment of a standalone public diplomacy agency, and tried to put public 
diplomacy activities in the camouflage of national images, cultural exchanges, 
educational programs. For public diplomacy researchers, these can hardly be a 
camouflage, because Cull (2008), Gilboa (2008) and many others have already 
categorized above-mentioned activities under the umbrella of public diplomacy. 
However, it is hard to deny that governments are labelling some of their sub-branches as 
“NGO”s, “NPO”s or “nondepartmental” for better public perception (Hartig, 2012). The 
camouflage can be effective for ordinary publics, and even for scholars who are not 
familiar with public diplomacy research.   
Because of this camouflage, many would argue about where to draw a line 
between governmental agencies and non-state actors in public diplomacy. For example, a 
                                                 
1 The current Chinese system of national governance is a combination of the party system and a government system. 
Sometimes these two systems go parallel but in other cases they don’t. For example, the “State Council Information 
Office” is at the same time “International Communication Office of the CPC Central Committee”. This means that the 




number of governments have established cultural promotion departments/agencies: public 
diplomacy researchers and practitioners are familiar with organizations like British 
Council (UK), Alliance Française (France), Goethe-Institut (Germany), Instituto 
Cervantes (Spain) and Confucius Institute (China), etc. Some researchers conceptualize 
them as channels of psychological influence or cultural promotion (Cull, 2008b; Gilboa, 
2008; Signitzer & Wamser, 2006). However, although these institutions often have 
diverse sources of funding including business corporations or private foundations, they 
only receive funding from one government in terms of government funding. Some of 
them are also subordinate to direct supervisions of central governments while claiming to 
be a “non-governmental organization”. 
Moreover, state-owned corporations should be conceptualized as a state actor in 
this dissertation. For example, charity campaigns of Chinese construction conglomerates 
in Latin America should be considered as a state action rather than a pure business 
strategy of promoting the image of the company’s social responsibility. This is because 
state-owned companies are more directly monitored, influenced and controlled by their 
governments in terms of outreach. Researchers would still argue that private 
multinational companies should not be considered as state actors but rather mediators. 
Indeed, privately owned multinational companies have more freedom in deciding their 
own priorities in terms of global marketing and foreign public opinion. While this 
dissertation categorizes companies such as CNN, BBC, Samsung and Apple as potential 
mediators of public diplomacy, it is still necessary for the reader to keep in mind that they 
are nevertheless subjects of government influences, and vice versa. For example, 
although BBC does not receive direct funding from the British government, it has a long 
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history of governmental affiliation and is still subject to a Royal Charter which the 
government can amend (Andrews, 2005). Samsung is a family-owned business, but its 
connections to the Korean government can be traced in the investigations of South 
Korean ex-president Park Geun-hye. 
Another type of state actors in public diplomacy is the delegated state actor. This 
type of actor often times do not try to cover their connection with the foreign 
government. Embassies and professional diplomats have played an important role in 
public diplomacy as well, but they are somehow perceived to be closer to the local 
citizens than their central government. For example, the pan-social debate on air pollution 
in China was inspired by a routine report of air quality in Beijing provided by the US 
embassy. The appointment of a Chinese American diplomat (Gary Faye Locke, a.k.a. 骆
家辉) as the US ambassador in China also inspired good hope of the Chinese citizens 
about Sino-American relations (Zhang, 2013). Another study of US embassy in South 
Korea also showed that embassies are good actors directly causing pro-American 
sentiments abroad (Lee & Jun, 2013). 
Another type of state actor often overlooked by researchers is the mediating state 
actor. This category includes a variety of different types of organizations that are funded 
and supported directly by a single government, but are functioning as a mediator in terms 
of the two mediator functions of performing and channeling (see next subheading for 
explication). The differences between a mediating state actor and a delegated state actor 
is that mediating state actors have mediating functions such as organizing local events, 
facilitating government-business-education negotiations and disseminating messages. A 
delegated state actor, like an embassy, can only negotiate with governments as a direct 
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representation of the government, and messages from diplomats usually depend on a 
certain type of media for dissemination. On the other hand, organizations such as the 
“nondepartmental” British Council, can host cultural events in foreign universities, and 
can collaborate with the British embassies in search for an official voice (Vickers, 2004). 
The Confucius Institute of China establish branches of Confucius Institutes of Confucius 
Classrooms with a joint-funding from a Chinese university and a foreign university 
(Hartig, 2012). The US-funded Al Hurra TV in the Middle East is an example of a 
government agency in the camouflage of a TV station (Powers & El Gody, 2009). Its 
main competitor in the region, Al Jazeera, should also be conceptualized as a mediating 
state actor because it is a state-owned media company of Qatar (Samuel-Azran, 2013).   
Of course, using ownership and source of funding as the only criteria to draw a 
line between state actors and non-state actors could be blunt. There is a series of studies 
about the factors influencing the editorial agenda and preferences of media agencies 
besides ownership, and there is also evidence that British Council and Confucius Institute 
have certain degrees of freedom in terms of policy-making and collaboration. But when 
researching a multi-faceted practice like public diplomacy, a clear structuralist 
categorization is useful so that the different objectives and effects of public diplomacy 
campaigns can be better categorized. If we can better understand the policy-wise 
patronage of actors, and the different goals of these actors, we could better answer 
questions about how different factors influence the outcomes of public diplomacy 
practice. In conclusion, Table 2.1 sums up the three types of state actors in terms of their 




Table 2.1 Typology of State Actors in Public Diplomacy 
 
Mediator: Performing and Channeling. 
Mediator in the current context could be understood as platforms, channels or tools for 
the modification of public opinion. These mediators do not necessarily have a 
spontaneous motive and objective in terms of modifying public opinion or activating 
publics (in the public relation sense) abroad, but are collaborators, tools or facilitators for 
governmental goals of public diplomacy. Thus, this particular definition does not limit 
the format, nationality or the size of a mediator entity: for example, the World Trade 
Organization can be a mediator through which the outcome of inter-governmental 
negotiations influences global public opinion about globalization and international trade 
policies. The Olympic Games can be a platform on which a government wins positive 
foreign public opinion by showing economic might, credibility and responsibility in 
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international commitment. Moreover, different forms of media (traditional and new) are 
perhaps the most important mediators in this process, for they serve the role of 
dissemination of information on a global scale.  
Table 2.2 Typology of Public Diplomacy Actors that could have Mediating Functions 
 
Although media and international organizations are two oversimplifying words, 
their differences are important: media are often the channels of communication, 
international organizations are often the venue of public diplomacy performances. 
Previous public diplomacy research studied both these two kinds of mediators, however, 
few studies addressed their differences in terms of their roles in public diplomacy. For 
example, studies about Western media in Color Revolutions treated Western media as a 
channel or a platform for the organization of activities (Sussman & Krader, 2008). But 
the actual incitation activities were carried out by activist groups with US support (Way, 
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2008). As discussed above, these activist groups should be categorized as mediating state 
actors, not a mediator. Similarly, a decision made within the WTO cannot travel by itself 
into the households of foreign people, but was transmitted by the global media such as 
The Wall Street Journal to the world audience. Thus, an analyst of public diplomacy 
should be careful when conceptualizing public diplomacy actors: for there are difference 
between a mediating state actor, a performing mediator and a channel mediator. Their 
differences are summarized in Table 2.2. 
To further clarify, mediators are entities that don’t receive funding and policy-
wise instructions from a single government. To qualify as a mediator, an organization 
should at least self-claim to be a non-partisan, objective information provider. For 
example, CNN and BBC as internationally recognized broadcasters, claim themselves as 
objective information providers with a balance of opinions in their news reporting. 
Secondly, a mediator could receive funding from a collection of governments, but not 
from a single government: international organizations could be mediators of public 
diplomacy because they are venues of international negotiation: taking the World Bank as 
an example, it provides a platform for negotiations about international fiscal policies, 
these policies often times determine the prospect of certain countries economic 
development and influences global expectations. The key takeaway here is that the World 
Bank does not make decisions, the decisions are an outcome of negotiation between 
different governments, meaning that no government has absolute power in making global 
fiscal policies.  
It is also true that in international negotiations, certain governments have more 
leverage in negotiations than others: The United Nations has a security council that 
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deliberately invested more leverage onto the US, UK, France, Russia and China as 
winners of World War II. Research about decision making in WTO also showed that 
there is power imbalance among member states. Media mediators have certain values that 
are akin to certain states as well: for example, content analyses showed that media of 
different nationalities reported the same events using different frames, and placed the 
events on different agendas. Recent research and media response in China to “biased 
Western values” also showed a conflict in values. These findings and many others have 
an important implication for this dissertation: mediators can hardly be value free and 
cannot assume a balance of voices within themselves.  
Publics: Activeness, Opinion Leaders and Elites. 
As discussed earlier, state actors have a variety of goals in public diplomacy, 
varying from incitation of foreign publics to building benign relationships with them. No 
matter which goal might be for a public diplomacy campaign, publics are a key factor in 
the process of reaching that objective. This section will discuss the segmentation of 
publics according to their activeness about a certain issue, the importance of opinion 
leaders and elites.  
Public relations theory has already provided an effective way of segmenting 
publics according to their activeness towards an issue or crisis involving a corporation. 
Public relations theorists define a public as “any group whose members have a common 
interest or common values in a particular situation” (Bowen, Rawlins & Martin, 2010). In 
the business management sense, the publics may include investor publics, media publics, 
activist publics, government publics or general publics, etc. The segmentation of publics 
was first proposed by Grunig (1997). He categorized the publics according to their 
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activeness into four types: nonpublics are not connected to the present issue in any way; 
latent publics are those who have possible connections to the present issue, but are not 
psychologically active in elaborating the issue; aware publics are already psychologically 
preoccupied with the issue but inactive in terms of behaviors; active publics are active 
both psychologically and behaviorally.  
This typology has useful implications to the management of public diplomacy, for 
they provide a method of categorizing active versus passive communicative behaviors 
and prioritizing certain strategies of public diplomacy. For example, the scale of the 
objective of a state actor in a certain public diplomacy project helps to identify 
nonpublics, if the objective is to promote national image around the globe in the Olympic 
Games, then there is probably no nonpublic for such project (everyone should at least be 
latent publics). However, if a project is country- o region-specific like the Al Hurra TV 
project, then the nonpublic is identifiable in terms of regional and religious focus, 
because the project is geo- and issue-specific. Moreover, one of the objectives of public 
diplomacy is to influence the policy-making process of another state actor. In many 
circumstances, this is done through the activation of publics in another state. The obvious 
example for this is the Arab Spring revolutions and the Color Revolutions in the mid-
1990s: these public diplomacy campaigns activated local publics’ awareness and 
behaviors in favor of “Western Democracy” (Bruns, Highfield, & Burgess, 2013; 
Khondker, 2011; Way, 2008), not only did they alter the policy-making process in many 
states, but also fundamentally reinstalled the regional political system. American 
embassy’s reports about air quality in Beijing inspired millions of unaware Chinese 
citizens to discuss air pollution on social media, forming pressure to national 
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environmental policies in the public discourse. Moreover, research about the role of 
ethics in public relations management (Bowen, 2004) also shows that incorporating 
values of autonomy, mutual respect and authenticity in activation campaigns could 
benefit campaign outcome, for the activists in foreign countries long for these values. 
Another dimension of the publics actor is the actor’s political and social ability in 
a certain social structure. The publics actor is NOT the last piece of a chain of 
psychological or behavioral influence. This is to say, although the objectives of public 
diplomacy are usually in people, but publics are constantly entangled in the process as a 
feedback provider for the state actors. For example, Entman (2008, p. 88) proposed a 
model of cascading network activation model to describe in a functionalist sense public 
diplomacy campaigns that involve “shorter term and more targeted efforts using mass 
communication (including the internet) to increase support of a country’s specific foreign 
policies among audiences beyond that country’s borders”. The applied model (Entman, 
2008, p. 98, shown in Figure 2.2) included feedback paths from public to national media 
and finally to the leaders of the ruling party. The publics actor in this model could be a 
goal in itself, but could also be an influencer of national policy, while being influenced 
by a “contestation of frames” (p. 90) from the US and the targeted country.  
The mediated public diplomacy’s cascading network model has at least two 
important implications for the current theorization: first, the final model considered the 
influence of “opposition elites in target nation” (Entman, 2008, p.98) in target nation 
media, and the US media/global media’s influence in target nation media. For a 
feedback-based policy-influencing strategy to work, it is important to establish 
connections to target country’s national media through opposition elites, which often 
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allows the US news frames to win in the “contestation of frames” against domestic or 
other types of news frames. This is to say that not only the segmentation and 
identification of publics is important, but that the management of the environment in 
which the desired messages are delivered is also vital.  
 
Figure 2.2 Entman (2008, p.98) Cascading Model of Public Diplomacy 
 
2.4 Relationships between Actors of Public Diplomacy 
This section will discuss the relationships between the different actors of public 
diplomacy mentioned earlier: namely the state actor, the mediator actor and the publics 
actor. Moreover, this section organizes these relationships and proposes a new 
structuralist model of public diplomacy. This new model illustrates not only the 
traditional single-sided model of public diplomacy, but also the two-sided model where 
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one state actor can influence another state actor’s public diplomacy practice. Thus, this 
section consists of two main parts: the first part constructs a traditional one-sided model 
with the new conceptualization of public diplomacy actors; the second part adds a mirror 
image of the one-sided model and discuss interactions between state actor A’s public 
diplomacy and state actor B’s. 
The One-Sided Ecology Model of Public Diplomacy. 
Public diplomacy is conceptualized as fundamentally a state action. Thus, this 
model begins with a state actor, and this is actually what many public diplomacy studies 
begin with in terms of analysis. For example, the Chinese central government have been 
hiring international PR firms around the world to promote Chinese culture in Time 
Square, New York City. The PR firms used advertisements on large billboards in the 
square as the media platform. In this typical case, the relationships between the state actor 
and the mediator can be conceptualized as (arrows are directions of influence, the same 
applies to other illustrations in this section): 
 
If we substitute the actual players with the actor types that they should be 




In this scenario, the state actor collaborated with the performing actor in terms of 
the strategic planning of the cultural promotion campaign. Collaboration was in place 
because the performing actor provides a venue of negotiation. For example, the 
international PR firms may have expertise in where and when to broadcast the content 
that the Chinese government hopes to put out; they could also have negotiated in terms of 
actual design of the advertisement and payment issues. The billboards do not belong to 
the PR companies as a property, but they are an important channel through which the 
negotiated strategies are broadcasted.  
In this particular case, the Chinese central government has little leverage against 
international PR companies, for the Chinese government possess little irreplaceable 
resource of their needs. The same applies to the relationship between the international PR 
companies and the billboard owners, for imaginably billboards on Times Square are 
popular for hire.  However, other cases provide evidence that the relationship between 
state actors and mediators are more than just mere hiring relationships. For example, 
many have studied the Olympic games as a venue of public diplomacy. The 1988 Seoul 
Olympic Games was expected by the then Korean government as an opportunity to show 
off Korean economic development, and to attract global attention to the North Korea 
problem. As Manheim (1990) put it, the Korea government was purchasing an “insurance 
against Northern invasion”. For the International Olympic Committee, it hopes to find an 
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economically capable state that could probably attract global attention.  This creates an 
interdependency between the International Olympic Committee and the Korean 
government because they both seeks unique resources from the other side.  
The successful 1988 Seoul Olympics reached households around the world not 
directly through the International Olympic Committee, but through international media 
and broadcasting. Take the US as an example, the then WNBC-4 got the authorization to 
broadcast the event, which would hopefully strengthen its domestic market share during 
the 1988 games. Vice versa, the International Olympic Committee makes a considerable 
amount of profit by selling broadcasting rights to TV stations around the world. 
Moreover, The WNBC-4 would have to rely on the South Korean government in terms of 
local protection and permissions to operate, and the South Korean government would 
also depend on WNBC -4 to deliver favorable images of South Korea as the host country 
in the US. In short, in this scenario, there would be an ecological relationship between the 
state and different mediators because of the many interdependencies: 
 
If we substitute the actual players with the actor types which they should be 




The ecology of the state-mediator relationships is an important model for the state 
actor to participate in international negotiation and execute its strategies, and it is also an 
important venue for international and trans-border organizations and media to gain 
vitality through government funding and other sources of revenues. However, because 
dependency is volatile and resources are flowing worldwide constantly, the inter-
dependencies between these actors will vary from one scenario to another (S.J. Ball-
Rokeach & DeFleur, 1976; Emerson, 1962; Grant, 1996). For example, the CNN and 
BBC are dominant in terms of coverage and audience size as an international media, and 
their connection to the US or UK state could be stronger than their relationship with other 
states. In cases where the state is using a mediating state actor (e.g. the British Council) 
to promote national culture and national values, the ecology may become the 
interdependencies between two state actors (the direct state actor, the mediating state 




Although the goals of different public diplomacy projects vary from persuasion to 
relationship building, their actualization needs the participation of the publics actors. As 
discussed, publics actors have two important functions: the first is to disseminate 
message and information for advocacy, and the second is to provide feedback for the 
public diplomacy strategy. For example, active groups of publics (active publics in a 
public relations sense) engage in communicative actions to help raise awareness about a 
political or cultural issue, and even engages in more direct political behaviors such as 
protests or riots, or cultural behaviors such as celebration, practice of language and ritual 
ceremonies. Publics with more communicative power like celebrities, social activists and 
academics can disseminate ideas to form debates in different social networks. Likewise, 
political elites of an opposing party can influence the state actors’ policy making process. 
In other words, the publics actors could be an end of public diplomacy, but they could 
also be a means of public diplomacy goals by providing constructive or corrective 
feedbacks. In sum, the relationship between the publics actor and state and mediator 
actors can be summarized as: 
 
Figure 2.3 Ecology Model of Public Diplomacy 
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This model resembles of combination of the ecology model between state and 
mediator actors and the public relations model of external environmental scanning and 
publics activation. Regarding the feedback links from the publics actors to mediator 
actors, it also incorporates Entman’s (2008) cascading activation model of mediated 
public diplomacy. Because of the necessity to consider Entman’s conceptualization of 
elite news media in this model, the elite publics was incorporated into this figure: 
however, this is not to say that elite publics belongs to the traditional typology of publics 
segmentation in the public relations sense. The elite publics is put above the other three 
types of publics (active-, aware- and latent-publics) because they indeed structurally 
becomes a special link between public opinion and media content: for the rise of social 
media has empowered many celebrities, politicians or experts to have more 
communicative ability than media organizations.   
In other words, although “elite publics” was only represented by a single box in 
Figure 2.3, what distinguish them from other types of publics is not their activeness, but 
their higher role in the publics activation process: they usually possess more resources 
and political power in terms of public opinion. Thus, it is reasonable to conceptualize the 
segmentation of elite publics as well: there would be active elites, aware elites, and latent 
elites (see last section for reasons why there would be almost no non-publics for public 
diplomacy).   
The interaction between these different types of publics could be further explored 
in another dissertation, the important point to make here is that information source and 
flows is conceptualized to have the ability to change citizens’ activeness on acting about 
an international issue. With existing measurement models, it is then possible for 
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researchers to observe the distinct activation effects of international news media: for 
example, aware publics usually perceive an issue as problematic, but is not feeling 
involved enough, or feeling powerless to do anything about it. Their communication with 
active publics and channeling mediators (often international media or broadcasters in a 
conventional sense) could psychologically enroll them into the issue and empower them.  
However, it is important to note that this model only depicts a one-sided story: 
that is, this model only tends to explain a mechanism by which one state actor 
communicates with the publics in another state. As discussed earlier, in this model there 
is an ignorance to the actions of state actors from another country. Because relationship 
building or communication between two collective entities are not exclusive, publics in 
country B can still have relationship with their own government, their domestic media 
and even actors from country C. Thus, in the following section, a two-sided story will be 
told about mechanism of a negotiation model of public diplomacy.   
The Two-Sided Negotiation Model of Public Diplomacy. 
Keeping the one-sided ecology model mentioned above in mind, this section sets 
free one of the assumptions of classical definitions of public diplomacy: that it is a 
relationship building/communication process involving two actors: a state and a target 
population. This section allows the three types of actors (state, mediator and publics) to 
simultaneously have relationships with two actors of another, but same type. For 
example, a state actor is permitted to have connection with not only foreign publics, but 
its domestic publics as well. At the same time, its domestic publics are the targeted 
population of public diplomacy projects from another country.  
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Let us label the hypothetical states as Country A and Country B for the 
convenience of further theoretical elaboration. The key point of the two-sided story is that 
either country can now attempt to influence the public diplomacy projects of its 
counterpart targeting its own publics actors. Assuming a scenario where state B wants to 
influence or modify the effect of state A’s public diplomacy on publics in B, real world 
cases showed that state B can achieve this by a) negotiation with state A and b) 
negotiation with mediators. 
Negotiation between state actors about public diplomacy usually happens to 
reinforce or facilitate such efforts. For example, the Japanese Cool Japan initiative 
involves negotiations between Japanese governmental agencies with foreign state 
agencies in Asian countries to facilitate the broadcast of Japanese programs on foreign 
TV screens (Daliot-Bul, 2009). The broadcast of some of the most famous Japanese TV 
dramas was also a result of negotiation between the Japanese and Chinese government. It 
was meant to soften hostile Chinese public opinion toward Japan for the normalization of 
diplomatic relationship. Local governments also negotiate directly with foreign cultural 
institutions such as Alliance Française to settle terms for local operation and activities 
(Paschalidis, 2009; Roberts, 2007).  
States negotiate with performing mediators such as the WTO, the International 
Monetary Fund, the UN for access to foreign media and more benign image on the world 
stage in general. International organizations are oftentimes the venue where countries 
negotiate to resolve conflict, decide financial aid or sanctions, and even make 
international fiscal policy. This gives countries an opportunity to send signals to citizens 
around the world about their attitude towards a particular issue and can be a part of global 
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public opinion management process. Countries within powerful networks of international 
organizations are often perceived to be more credible and responsible as well. Other 
performing mediators such as NGOs are even more convenient for states to gain access to 
a specific public opinion arena. At the local level, performing mediators such as 
universities function as hubs of educational and cultural exchange, but they do have to 
negotiate with foreign government agencies regarding financial support, visa policies and 
an appropriate purpose of such exchange programs.  
With country A’s channeling mediators, state actors in B usually negotiate in 
terms of their operations domestically. For example, failure of successfully negotiate a 
deal about operation standards and regulations with the Chinese government caused the 
blocking of Facebook and Twitter in mainland China. HBO and CNN also need to tailor 
their content when broadcasting in other parts of the world both in terms of language and 
content to stay in line with the local regulations.  
In sum, when state B can negotiate with state A’s state actors and mediators, a 
negotiation model of public diplomacy is in place by adding a mirror image of the 
ecology model beside itself: 
 
Figure 2.4 Competition Model of Public Diplomacy 
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The figure above shows a prototype of the negotiation model of public diplomacy. 
However, it is important to mention that mediators of A and B is combined as single 
boxes in this figure. This may create difficulty in illustrating the transnational 
relationship between state actors and mediators, but it does explain the truth that the key 
of state actors’ influence on channeling mediator is access and competition: as more 
traditional forms of domestic media and governmental media becomes more 
internationalized, and with the emergence of international social media, the international 
mediator arena is a list of information platforms that both A and B’s publics can choose 
from. For example, government control over social media access and competition of 
international vs. domestic news frames happens in the box of “channeling media of A and 
B”, while international negotiations and traditional diplomacy results derive from 
performing mediators and become information used in public diplomacy. Last but not the 
least, since there is the existence of international social media, the activation of key 
publics in B can often times be done by elite publics or active publics in A through an 
international social media channeling mediator.  
That said, because of the many specific relationship between the actors, the figure 
above lacks simplicity. For simplicity, the negotiation model can be illustrated as: 
 
Figure 2.5 Simplified Competition Model of Public Diplomacy 
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Based on this negotiation model, the dissertation hopes to provide empirical 
evidence to support the state-mediator linkage and the mediator-publics linkage. The 
following two chapters includes two empirical analysis of a) A’s state actor’s interference 
with B’s mediator’s media credibility and b) a publics activation model to examine 
different types of mediators’ effect in the activation of publics in another country. 
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CHAPTER 3. STATE MODERATION OF FOREIGN MEDIA 
CREDIBILITY 
International media compete for audiences around the world. At the same time, 
for a sovereign state, its domestic audiences are seeking relevantly credible information 
from a collection of news media. This is especially true in China, as the state has been 
cautious about the dissemination of foreign information among Chinese audiences. 
Chapter II theorized that governments have the interest and ability to influence the 
process of global media competition, and an important subject of governments’ interest to 
modify is foreign media credibility among its citizens.  
 
 
Figure 3.1Conceptual Links Tested in Chapter 3 
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This chapter studies the conceptual model shown in figure 3.1: control on media 
accessibility leads to the possibility of modifying audiences’ perception of 
domestic/foreign media credibility (which is a part of the grand models discussed in 
chapter II). Such perception of global media credibility further leads to audiences’ 
dependence on domestic vs. foreign media. In other words, the power to control media 
accessibility as information resources could create power imbalance between the state 
and the mass public. And such power could be valuable in the process of public 
diplomacy: because, as Chapter II illustrated, public diplomacy could be understood as a 
power ecology between the state, the mediators and the mass public (the one-sided 
ecology model). 
This chapter provides theoretical analysis of past research on media credibility, 
media accessibility and media system dependency. It works as an empirical extension of 
Chapter II to test its theoretical arguments: especially focusing on governmental 
influence in the domestic arena of public diplomacy. At the end of this chapter, when the 
hypotheses are proposed, a psychometric structural equation model was operationalized 
and proposed to illustrate the conceptual relationship in figure 3.1. 
The current chapter does not intend to carry any judgmental discourse to national 
policy, but to view governmental intervention as an unavoidable part of global media 
competition. For the current chapter, the phrase governmental control only assumes that 
governments have relative power to global media organizations (either of foreign or 
domestic origin) because their legitimate ownership of, as well as responsibility to, 
resources in legislation and public infrastructure. This is particularly important, because 
although this chapter chooses the Chinese context for empirical examination, the theory 
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is NOT about “Chinese governmental control of information”, but rather a general 
depiction of all governments’ important role in global media competition, especially at 
the domestic stage. Of course, choosing the Chinese context could potentially benefit the 
upcoming empirical analysis, because media ownership in China can be more centralized 
and controlled in comparison to that in other places.   
 
3.1 State Actors in Camouflage: The Question of Why 
Information transparency has been brought to the publics’ attention after the 2016 
US election, when the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s concern about Russian 
interference in US presidential election was reported by US and international media. This 
is an important real-world case illustrating the fact that a government (a state actor) can 
be upset and sensitive to foreign manipulation of domestic public opinion. The alleged 
Russian interference happened in the format of “Fake news” which was propagated 
through social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and Youtube. In January 2018, 
CBS accused RT (Russian Today), a Russia-based international broadcaster, for its 
interference in the 2016 US election, basing the arguments on a report from Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence (2017) pointing out that RT functions as “the Kremlin’s 
principal international propaganda outlet” to assist in the leak of DNC data during the 
2016 election. (Simonyan, 2018) 
But, how is this, and other similar cases, important in explaining why state actors 
want to take camouflage? One of the reasons may be simple: the ownership and funding 
of an international broadcaster are critical for its credibility as perceived by global 
audience. The ODNI report has explained how RT adopted various strategies to achieve 
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“formal disassociation from Kremlin” which “facilitates RT US messaging” (Office of 
the Director of National Intelligence, 2017, p. 12). In the interview with CBS, Margarita 
Simonyan (Editor-in-chief of RT) countered such accusations as she thinks CBS and US 
intelligence agencies are “destroying our reputation.” (Margarita Simonyan, 2018, 1:15)  
In their analysis of RT’s engagement with global audience during the 2014 Sochi 
Winter Olympics, one study (Hutchings, Gillespie, Yablokov, Lvov, & Voss, 2015) 
pointed out that RT is militarizing the global information environment and assumed that 
there is no objectivity to begin with in international broadcasting, for RT, international 
broadcasting efforts are a “counter-hegemonic struggle”. The paper argues that RT 
conceptualizes the information arena to be a highly competitive environment for 
credibility. For the US-funded Al Hurra in the Middle East, researchers found that 
identification of Al Hurra’s ownership negatively influences its perceived credibility 
among local viewers, and that knowledge about Al Hurra’s ownership also negatively 
moderates the relationship between viewing and opinion about the United States 
(Dabbous & Nasser, 2009; Douai, 2009; Samei, 2010).  
Gass and Seiter (2009) also pointed out that credibility plays an important role in 
public diplomacy effectiveness and outcome. Their analysis on culture and good will as 
covariates of credibility implied that, in culturally different or conflicting environments, 
identification of ownership or cultural source could be detrimental to the perception of a 
medium’s credibility. After all, as El-Nawaway (2006) pointed out: perceived intentions 
of the medium to persuade would have a negative effect on perceived credibility, and in a 
culturally and ideologically different information environment, the intention of the source 
can easily be doubted by a conservative population such as the Chinese one. Moreover, 
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mainstream media predominant in the current environment have the advantage of framing 
such intention to win the credibility competition. 
Thus, in the context of international broadcasting, unless being forced to declare 
ownership and source of funding by law, it is reasonable to argue that global mediators, 
either state-funded or non-state-funded, would not be willing to actively advertise about 
its source of funding or ownership. And for state-funded mediating actors in public 
diplomacy, as they often operate in a foreign environment, and perhaps with a national 
strategic goal, a pan-social acknowledgement about its ownership and funding source 
could be detrimental to its credibility and influence. It is also one of the reasons why 
Youtube launched an experimental project to label videos on its site in terms of 
ownership and funding source, with the hope to “equip users with additional information 
to help them better understand the sources of news content that they choose to watch on 
YouTube.” (Youtube, 2018) 
 
3.2 Differentiation of Foreign and Domestic Media 
In previous studies about foreign media framing, foreign media effects, and 
foreign media credibility, it seems that the actual definition of foreign media was 
overlooked. For example, Willnat, He and Xiaoming (1997) skipped this definition, but 
associated “foreign” with concepts such as Western and US media. In other studies that 
have used the concept of foreign media, it was also unclear how the author defined what 
is foreign and what is domestic. Given the discussion offered in the previous subheading, 
it is known that state mediating actors often have the intention to not actively disclose 
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their ownership to preserve credibility. And this fact contributes fiercely to the 
importance of distinguishing what actually make media foreign and domestic.  
For example, apart from RT’s efforts of disassociating itself from Kremlin 
through the establishment of an international media NGO, as well as Al Hurra’s efforts to 
emphasis its association with the new democratic Iraqi government rather than directly 
with the US government, the Chinese government is adopting an even more subtle way to 
dissociate itself from its affiliated or collaborating global media. Sun’s (2014) study 
showed that China Radio International is collaborating with private companies in 
Australia to deliver image-enhancing messages. Without his study, this link could be 
much more difficult for international scholars to identify. For the Australian government, 
as well for other governments mentioned in previous cases, there is indeed a difficulty in 
distinguishing foreign media from domestic media, because of the further integration of 
government agencies in the global media in general.  
Although this is an important point to be addressed in this study, it does not 
examine the conceptual differences between foreign media and domestic media among 
policy makers, or among general publics. This may be the focus of another study, but for 
the Chinese context, this study adopts the following criteria (if such information is 
unknown, then it will not be introduced to respondents in the survey) to define what is a 
foreign media and what is domestic, a media organization will be identified as foreign 
media in China if: 
• The location of the owner of a media organization is not in claimed territories 
of the People’s Republic of China. 
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• The editorial language of the mother company of the media organization is 
not Mandarin, dialects of the Chinese language or non-sinic languages 
officially used in P.R. China as secondary languages2. 
• The media organization has Chinese versions of its contents targeting Chinese 
publics. 
Thus, this study includes media organizations such as CNN, BBC, New York 
Times, The Economics, The Financial Times, Asahi Shinbum, etc. as foreign media. And 
these media were used as examples in the questionnaire to help the respondents to better 
conceptualize what is foreign vs. what is domestic.  
3.3 Aspects of Global Media Credibility 
The study of media credibility as a psychometric construct developed by Hovland, 
Janis, & Kelley (1953). Their primary concern was not credibility itself, but rather how 
different characteristics of information sources can have different influences on 
attitudinal change. What they found are two significant factors that are related to 
credibility: source expertise and source trustworthiness. The trustworthiness aspect of 
their findings went on to inspire a series of media effect studies that focuses on media 
credibility, and mistrust or distrust in media, plus their relationship with audiences’ 
attitudinal or behavioral change. As a factor underlying a reader’s or viewer’s evaluation 
of news, the concept of credibility has been defined primarily in three ways: (1) message 
                                                 
2 In this criterion, the Korean language and the Mongolian language are excluded, for they are used as 
official languages in parts of China and in other countries. 
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(or story), (2) source (or organization), and (3) media (or channel) credibility (Sundar, 
1999). 
Kiousis’ (2001) previous research on media credibility mentions two types of 
credibility usually studied in mass communication: source credibility focuses on the 
communicator, who is usually an individual, group or an organization; and medium 
credibility (or channel credibility) that focuses on the media through which information is 
transmitted. Such categorization explains theoretically the different facets of credibility 
study in mass communication, and it implied that credibility itself can be analyzed in 
terms of the communicator, the channel and the message itself (Bucy, 2003; Fico, 
Richardson, & Edwards, 2004; Kiousis, 2001).  
This dissertation does not examine the differences in journalism professionalism 
or the used of different technologies between foreign media in China and domestic media 
in China. Because of this, although the aspects of source expertise (message) and channel 
(whether it is TV, radio, newspaper, etc.) credibility would greatly add to the depth of 
this dissertation, it would be too overwhelming for the respondents to consider all aspects 
of media credibility at a single time. Given the public diplomacy focus of this 
dissertation, this study is more interested in the source credibility, or source 
trustworthiness of the foreign vs. media organizations discussed earlier.  
Wanta and Hu (1994) conceptualized media source credibility to have two facets: 
the first one being believability and the second one being affiliation. Believability stands 
for how unbiased, trustworthy, fair and professional a media is, while affiliation stands 
for audiences’ perception of whether the media works in favor of their well-being and 
speaks for their interests. This conceptualization was also widely used in other studies 
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which has the strong interest in media’s relationship with the publics, just as this 
dissertation does. This dissertation argues that, conceptually, the perception of the 
credibility of a foreign media relies on publics’ affective and cognitive identification of 
the nature of the relationship between them and the media organization: after all, when it 
comes to foreign media credibility, a foreign media could be perceived as highly 
professional but yet not trustworthy.  
 
3.4 Selctive Control on Media Accessibility in the Chinese Context 
Media accessibility is often ignored or mixed with media use/exposure in previous 
studies. However, this dissertation conceptualizes media accessibility to be an 
antecedent of credibility perception. In their study about media credibility and media 
reliance, Wanta and Hu claimed that their study does not assume “there is a passive 
phase before the active phase” (1994, p. 92) for credibility’s influence on reliance (i.e. 
dependency). In other words, Wanta and Hu (1994) did not test whether a “passive” 
reliance can lead to increase in perceived media credibility (e.g. a person was exposed 
passively to partisan media at early age, and trusted that particular media), they only 
tested that perceived media credibility can lead to active reliance. For them, the 
differentiation of passive and active reliance seems to be a chicken-or-the-egg question 
again.  
Even so, this chicken-or-the-egg question can be well-explained by media 
dependency theory, as well as by the ecology public diplomacy model on which the 
current chapter is based. Passive dependency, or “exposure” in previous researchers’ 
words, is usually caused by audiences’ lack of power in controlling their information 
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environment. For example, for a child, the power to control social and political 
information environment usually lies in the hands of the parents. Emerson’s (1962) view 
on relative power and dependency contributed largely to the formation of media system 
dependency theory. He conceptualized relative power as the inverse of dependency, and 
that relative power between entities A and B is determined by B’s need for resources 
from A and B’s access to alternative sources of such resource. For global media’s 
competition for media credibility in the context of public diplomacy, the resource is 
obviously information/news. 
The second set of political communication related to the concept of media 
accessibility in China is selective exposure. This is because selective exposure to 
information and its impact on citizens’ political behavior also related to competition of 
media and the competition of ideas. Selective exposure is defined in the literature as “the 
selection of information matching their beliefs”: for example, people who have more 
conservative political inclinations in the U.S. may select to attend to conservative media 
such as Fox News or Breitbart, and conservative ideas would be reinforced in their 
minds as they stay tuned. This may be also true in China as diversity of political 
inclinations are allowed among Chinese media: for example, Phoenix TV from 
HongKong and the Southern Weekly are two comparatively more liberalist and critical 
media than other media organizations more directly associated with the government (e.g. 
China Central TV, People’s Daily, etc.).   
However, when it comes to international affairs and foreign policy, the diversity 
of news agendas and frames within Chinese media is still not comparable on the global 
scale. Directly adopting the traditional conceptualization and operationalization of 
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selective exposure in Western literature may not suffice to capture the situation of media 
accessibility or media availability in China. For accessibility pre-defines the information 
resources available for Chinese citizens, and selective exposure was created as a 
psychometric concept in the Western context: where systematic control on information 
content has been more implicit and perhaps less stringent. In short, given the Chinese 
context, although selective exposure is a concept that overlaps with Chinese citizens’ 
exposure to different types of media, in many cases, some selections are not presented to 
Chinese citizens.  
At this point, access to news media becomes particularly important, because a 
priori access to a particular news source can be necessary for an audience to believe in 
such news source (i.e. the passive reliance link to media credibility not discussed by 
Wanta and Hu). In other words, access could precede affective and cognitive knowledge 
about media credibility, and perceived credibility lead to dependency on media. If a 
person has no convenient access to New York Times, he/she may not even have a 
chance and experiential basis to form knowledge about the New York Times’ credibility 
(other than hearing other information source talking about New York Times3). The 
rationale behind this logic is that resources for information could be deliberately 
restricted, creating a power imbalance which ultimately leads to media dependency.  
The importance of media accessibility in the Chinese media context has been 
discussed by numerous scholars. First of all, the conceptualizations of media accessibility 
in China are unbalanced because the majority of them tends to focus on Web accessibility 
                                                 
3 On the other hand, if someone he/she personally knows does have knowledge about the New York Times, 
then it is possible that accessing the New York Times is not difficult given that particular person’s social 
environment.   
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or Internet accessibility. Nevertheless, (Chan, 1994) examined four types of accessibility 
of STAR TV in the pan-Asian area, exploring why different levels of restrictions were 
put onto the broadcasting of STAR TV in distinct regions/countries. The study of STAR 
TV’s accessibility established a model for accessibility of satellite TV and listed eight 
factors influencing the accessibility of STAR TV in East Asia. These factors include 
national regulation, competition from terrestrial television, technological innovation, 
linguistic barriers, cultural gaps, national affluence, programming policy and financing.  
Studies focusing on other types of accessibility in China have explored two 
different facets of accessibility: the first one is the technological accessibility: elevation 
of penetration rates of Internet technology, amelioration of user friendliness of Chinese 
websites (Yao, Qiu, Huang, Du, & Ma, 2011) and the facilitation of e-government in 
China with the help of increased Web accessibility (Rau, Zhou, Sun, & Zhong, 2016) The 
second one is policy accessibility: the government control of accessibility of Internet sites 
and its psychological consequences (Zhu & He, 2002). While both angles can be related 
to global media competition for credibility, the second one is the main concern of this 
research, because restrictions of Internet accessibility help to provide a resource-based 
conceptualization of media credibility. Zhu and He (2002) rationalized their argument as: 
“Information accessibility refers to the extent to which the audience has 
access to a diversified range of information. In particular, our concern 
is with the number of alternative sources of information available to the 
audience in addition to the official media. Previous research on mere 
exposure has demonstrated that exposure to information alone can 
make a big difference in knowledge, attitudes, and behavior (Zajonc, 
1974). Conversely, as inoculation research has suggested, individuals 
living in a “germ-free” environment are more likely to be affected by a 




The STAR TV study and the studies on Web accessibility further illustrate how 
global media competition happened in the context of China or even East Asia (Greater 
China region including China mainland, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macau at least). These 
findings, however, were usually written in a critical fashion.  
For this dissertation, the conceptualization of media accessibility adopts the route 
of policy accessibility mentioned above. That is, the conceptualization of accessibility in 
this study does NOT focus on the Internet penetration rate, how many TV stations are 
available for an average person, etc. Rather, it focuses on Chinese citizens’ perception on 
how easily, given Chinese media policies and current social environment, they can access 
a diversified set of foreign or domestic media for a particular type of information.  
  
3.5 Selective Accessibility Control and Media Credibility 
This section adds more discussion to the rationale of this relationship in a 
competitive environment for media credibility, and especially in the context of Chinese 
media landscape as a subject of public diplomacy.  
After all, how does accessibility relate to credibility? In Zhu and He’s (2002) 
study, their focus was not on this question, but rather on the effects of accessibility and 
credibility on citizens’ value system. More specifically, they found that access to Chinese 
mainland and Hong Kong TV can have different, if not opposite, effects on citizens’ 
value system: mainland TV associates with communist values and Hong Kong TV relates 
to materialist values. At the same time, credibility in domestic and foreign media have 
similar effects on citizens’ value system: they (domestic media credibility vs. foreign 
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media credibility) were competing and creating different values in citizens’ minds. Other 
studies compared the relations between media exposure and postmaterialist values in 
China and the U.S. and found significant relationships between the two in both countries 
(Cho et al., 2003; Ran Wei & Pan, 1999). However, few research have looked into the 
relationship between accessibility/exposure and credibility, and most of the studies have 
treated them both as independent variables and have not attempted to study the 
relationship between themselves.  
That said, the empirical evidence provided by these studies found that 
accessibility to a source often works in the same direction with credibility of the source 
as independent variables. This finding provides indirect support to the hypothesis that 
accessibility to domestic media could positively influence perceived credibility of 
domestic media (and the same for foreign media). Given such data, this chapter is also 
interested in exploring whether accessibility to foreign media could influence credibility 
of foreign media. Therefore, this chapter has the following set of hypotheses: 
H1a: For foreign media, perceived media accessibility positively leads to 
perceived media credibility  
H1b: For domestic media, perceived media accessibility positively leads 
to perceived media credibility  
 
When it comes to the relationship between foreign media credibility and domestic 
media credibility, Golan and Kiousis’ (2010) results suggested that there is a strong 
correlation (r > .65) between foreign and domestic media credibility, however, they 
focused on their different effects and did not make an argument on why this is the case. 
It is possible that, given their result, foreign media credibility and domestic media 
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credibility are different, yet overlapping, facets of a more general “media credibility” or 
“trust in media” concept. This dissertation is interested in showing the effect of those 
non-overlapping parts of foreign and domestic media credibility on each other.  
Previously studies seem to be not interested in how their unique variances affect 
each other, if their covariances are controlled for (variances caused by a spurious social 
cognition variable like trust in all media, trust in all government). Because domestic 
media is more ubiquitous than foreign media in China, it is possible that if a person has 
access to foreign media, he/she is already unsatisfied with the credibility of domestic 
media, or is seeking alternative points of view; otherwise he/she would not be motivated 
to find access to foreign media content. On the other hand, if we assume that Chinese 
domestic media do not deliberately defame or attack foreign media, then it will be hard to 
argue that if a Chinese person has high trust in domestic media, he/she will have low trust 
in foreign media. Thus, the following hypotheses proposed: 
H2: Perception of foreign media credibility will negatively influence 
perception of domestic media credibility   
 
3.6 Media Credibility and Media Dependency 
Researchers have studied the relationship between media use and media 
credibility. Kiousis (2001) found that there are significant positive associations between 
media use and perceived media credibility for both newspaper and online news, 
however, the study did not find relationship between TV use and perceived TV 
credibility. Tsfati and Cappella (2003)explored the relationship between two similar 
concepts: news exposure and media skepticism. Although media skepticism may have 
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less emphasis on source credibility, it does have an emphasis on audiences’ perception 
of media credibility (p. 507). Tsfati and Cappella also found that media skepticism is 
positively associated with nonmainstream news exposure and negatively associated with 
mainstream news exposure. Moreover, they found that media skeptics consumed a 
significantly larger share of nonmainstream news, and that higher media skepticism was 
associated with lower mainstream news consumption and higher nonmainstream media 
consumption (as a combination of total media diet). 
Golan and Kiousis (2010) explored the different effects of domestic and foreign 
media credibility on citizens’ assessment of democracy in the Arabic world. They 
argued that there is a strong relationship between media credibility and people’s 
cognitive (Salwen & Matera, 1992; Semetko, Brzinski, Weaver, & Willnat, 1992) and 
affective (Wanta, Golan, & Lee, 2004) evaluation of foreign nations. In their study, their 
conceptualization and measurement of the media credibility variable was very similar, 
or even identical, to a conceptualization of media reliance or media dependency (see 
Golan & Kiousis, p. 90). This shows that conceptually media credibility and media 
dependency are highly related. 
More importantly, as mentioned but not elaborated on earlier, Wanta and Hu 
(1994) studied the relationship between media credibility and media reliance. The 
introduction of the concept of reliance further enrich the theoretical context for the 
current discussion. This is because, in contrast to the previously mentioned studies that 
focused on media usage or media exposure, the concept of reliance introduces the 
difference between passive usage (exposure) and active usage (reliance or dependency). 
Wanta and Hu (1994) based their theoretical argument about media reliance on the 
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media system dependency theory proposed by Ball-Rokeach and DeFleur (1976). The 
findings were that participants’ perceptions of media credibility are related to their 
media dependency.  
In general, media dependency theory explains the relationships between 
governments, the market, the media and audiences. At the individual level, Grant (1996) 
argued that citizens rely on media for six different purposes: self-understanding, social 
understanding, individual orientation, interaction orientation, individual play and social 
play. Grant and other media system dependency scholars tested these dimensions of 
media dependency in a variety of contexts including television shopping (Grant, 
Guthrie, & Ball-Rokeach, 1991), patterns of television viewing (Rosenstein & Grant, 
1997; Waterman & Grant, 1991), political communication (Loges, 1994),etc. In 
comparison to Wanta and Hu (1994)’s study, the conceptualization and the actual 
operationalization of media dependency and the “reliance” in their study are also similar 
given their common theoretical root.  
In this chapter, the understanding and orientation dimensions of the individual 
media system dependency are taken into consideration. This is because, as will be 
explained in Chapter IV, that this dissertation examines all its empirical models in the 
context of Chinese citizens’ understanding and behavioral intention about air pollution 
in China. This topic is less related to the play dimension of media dependency, and thus 





Figure 3.2 Model Specification Allowing Direct Credibility Competition 
 
Conceptually, Chinese citizens’ reliance on foreign and domestic media could be 
conceptualized in media system dependency terms: similar to credibility, it is expected 
that foreign media dependency would be positively related to domestic media 
dependency, because they are different but overlapping components of an overarching 
“media system dependency” (Sandra J. Ball-Rokeach, 1985). Because they are still 
conceptually different, foreign media dependency would be explained more by foreign 
media credibility, and domestic media would be explained more by domestic media 
credibility. Here, the following hypotheses are proposed: 
H3a: Perception of foreign media credibility will negatively influence 
dependency on foreign media for understanding and orientation 
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H3b: Perception of domestic media credibility will negatively 
influence dependency on domestic media for understanding and 
orientation. 
Thus, all the hypotheses proposed in the current chapter can be allocated 




CHAPTER 4. ACTIVATING AND DEACTIVATING PUBLICS 
This chapter builds on the theoretical models illustrated in chapter II, and 
continues the design of empirical examinations illustrated in chapter III. In chapter II, the 
one-sided ecological model and the two-sided negotiation model were conceptualized 
with the assumption that state actors have the goal of influencing global public opinion. 
This assumption is the theoretical basis for this chapter to further connect people’s media 
dependency to their psychological antecedents of communicative behavior. These 
psychological antecedents are as far as this dissertation will go, for theories in political 
public relations and political communication have already linked political participation 
(including communicating behaviors) to governmental policy change (Aldrich, Sullivan, 
& Borgida, 1989; Groeling & Baum, 2008).  
Chapter III discussed what constitutes media dependency in a competitive global 
media environment by focusing on the roles played by media accessibility and media 
credibility.  The empirical models subject to examination will be continued in this chapter 
by adding three more psychological antecedents after media dependency: namely 
problem recognition, constraint recognition and involvement recognition (Grunig, 1997; 
Kim & Grunig, 2011).  
For the three sets of variables in chapter III (accessibility, credibility, and 
dependency), there are two dimensions being measured: one is foreign and the other is 
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domestic. This distinction allows a to comparison of the perception of foreign and 
domestic media in China, and how such perception played out as a key factor influencing 
people’s dependency on foreign or domestic media. As a continuation, the key research 
questions this chapter responds to is:  would dependency on either foreign media or 
domestic media lead to higher activeness (conceptualized as communicative behavior 
motivation) among Chinese citizens to speak out about air pollution? And, is Chinese 
people’s dependency on foreign media a more significant and important factor for their 
communicative behavior about air pollution in China, or is dependency on domestic 
media the more important one?  
In sum, this chapter’s focus is on the activation of publics given consideration 
about their different levels of dependency on foreign and domestic media. Note that this 
activation is not what was discussed in chapter II as pubic actions (such as voting, 
protesting or rebelling) which could influence policy change. The word activation in this 
chapter only refers to a psychological active state of the publics: this is, in public 
relations research, the segmentation of public activeness. Also, although public relation 
scholars (Bowen, 2010; Grunig, 1997) were concerned about self-activation (e.g. 
information seekers), this dissertation focuses on the activations caused by an external 
source (i.e. public diplomacy). Therefore, it was stated earlier that “these psychological 
antecedents are as far as this dissertation will go”. That said, the three psychological 
antecedents (problem recognition, constraint recognition and involvement recognition) 
were under empirical examination in international public relations scenarios, which 
showed that they do connect tightly to people’s consequent communicative behavior 
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(Kim & Grunig, 2011). This is the first thing that should be explained in detail in this 
chapter.  
The second thing that this chapter needs to do is clarify how the hypotheses in 
chapter III fit in with the analytical context of the current chapter. In other words, this 
chapter needs to explain why dependency is expected to influence people’s psychological 
antecedents of communicative behavior, and whether or not the assumptions of these two 
different theories are in conflict (i.e. media system dependency theory, situational theory 
of problem solving) and how they can coexist in harmony. Moreover, this chapter 
explores the interplay between these two theories, using this insight to extend the 
empirical models.  
4.1 The link between public relations and diplomacy 
Keeping the theoretical models illustrated in chapter II in mind, this dissertation’s 
theory building focuses on the structural relationship between state actors, mediators, and 
publics in the context of public diplomacy. One of the goals of public diplomacy is 
influencing the public opinion, attitudes, or behavior in another country, and it is these 
goals which bind together the two major variables in this chapter: media dependency and 
problem-solving antecedents. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, media system dependency theory is 
suitable in the current structuralist-functionalist model of public diplomacy because of its 
assumptions about the ecological dependences among the state, the media, and the 
market. On the other hand, the three problem-solving antecedents chosen as a 
psychological outcome of public activation derives from the situational theory of 
problem solving (i.e. STOPS, Kim, 2006; Kim & Grunig, 2011). The STOPS model is an 
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extension to the earlier situational theory of publics (i.e. STP, Grunig, 1976). While STP 
was a typology of the “publics” in terms of their activeness towards a certain 
organizational, social, or political issue, the STOPS model explained the kinds of 
communication activities that different types of publics engage.  
Conceptually, the STP and the STOPS are both in accordance with the grand 
theoretical models proposed in chapter II. One of the reason is that both have the 
assumption that publics could be identified, that is, both theories invented ways to draw 
boundaries between groups of publics by differentiating their activeness towards the 
issue. In essence, either STP (Grunig, 1997) or STOPS (Kim & Grunig, 2011) can be 
structural-functionalist, for these two theories describe the relationship between the 
organization and its publics, and they explain how the organization and the publics could 
approach each other for mutual benefit. Tracing it further, Grunig (1997) based his work 
on the research of Jerald Hage (Hage & Aiken, 1967), who is also a structural-
functionalist researcher in many ways. That is, the organization and the different types of 
publics (active, aware, latent, non-) are functions of each other when a goal is put in 
place.  
These assumptions concur with the basic assumptions of the public diplomacy 
model: firstly, states and governments can be, and often are, considered as organizations 
(Bowen, 2011). Using the typology explained in chapter II, a state actor can be 
conceptualized as an organization (a governmental or government-supported agency) 
with a goal (change foreign public opinion or behavior4). The mediating actors and the 
                                                 
4 This is one of the goals of public diplomacy, and it is also a core objective. See chapter II for definitions 
of public diplomacy. 
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publics constitute the state actor’s pool of stakeholders. Thus, in public relations terms, 
the organization need to continuously monitor the outside environment in order to adapt 
to or modify it (Bowen, Rawlins, & Martin, 2010; Bowen, 2011; Grunig, 1992).  
For public diplomacy, state organizations do both at different levels: state 
agencies adapt to the international environment of public diplomacy by adopting similar 
approaches, changing output contents, reframing appearance and outlook, increasing 
compatibility, etc. In these cases, state agencies want to adapt because, in many cases, 
modifying outside environment in terms of social structure and foreign operational 
policies can be difficult.  
However, in the context of public diplomacy, state agencies’ diplomatic behaviors 
are situational in terms of public opinion and publics’ behavior, by the fact that the 
“organizations” in public diplomacy are governments and usually have political power 
over domestic publics. This makes public diplomacy different from public relations in the 
organization-publics power imbalance. Domestically, government-publics relationship is 
different than corporate-publics relationship given that power imbalance. For foreign 
publics, however, the government then has less power in most cases, thus, many of those 
successful public diplomacy campaigns adapt to the environment, those who attempt to 
modify the environment usually failed.  
But, where should a government start when it wants to influence domestic 
publics? In other words, if we assume that there is indeed a domestic extension of public 
diplomacy where governments modify incoming influence, which theories have 
discussed things worth of monitoring? These “things of monitoring interests” should 
better not be an actual protest, an on-going rebellion or epidemic public dissent, because 
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it would be too late when these are observable. Public relations theories also suggested 
that public relations management should always prevent a crisis or a problem from 
happening, and post hoc “solutions” to an existing crisis could already be the worst 
solution (Bowen et al., 2010; Grunig, 1992).  
Therefore, the STP and STOPS have gained much popularity both in academia 
and industry, for they monitor publics’ problem recognition processes and predict their 
possible future communicative behavior. Communicative behaviors are considered to be 
important antecedents, or predictors, of more actual behaviors such as voting or 
protesting. Much of the mass communication or political communication literature 
already illustrated how citizens’ communication-formed attitudes led to their further 
political behavior. There is also research showing mass communication processes or 
political campaigns can suppress political efficacy and even political participation. In 
sum, it is arguable that communicative behavior, as well as its psychological antecedents, 
can modify how ordinary citizens approach political issues around them.  
4.2 Psychological Antecedent of Communicative Behavior 
Some may wonder why the current empirical examination only chose the three 
antecedents in the STOPS model (namely problem recognition, constraint recognition, 
involvement recognition), while there are many other possible psychometric variables to 
look at in political communication literature. For example, political efficacy (Kenski & 
Stroud, 2006; Pinkleton, Austin, & Fortman, 1998), political trust (Camaj, 2014; Chen & 
Shi, 2001), and third-person-effect (Davison, 1983; R. Wei & V, 2015) are associated 




The first reason is the STOPS’ focus on people’s conceptualization of a problem. 
This focus is important in the context of public diplomacy, and in the theoretical models 
proposed in chapter II as well. Public diplomacy includes the explanation of government 
policies and governmental attitudes to foreign publics, usually with the help of media and 
international organizations. Thus, the portrayals and agendas of an international issue in 
media are critical for the publics to understand the issue. For example, Entman (1991) 
studied how the Korean Air Lines incident was depicted differently by media in different 
nations in terms of definitions and attribution of responsibility. Similar studies have 
showed that issues of global warming (Billett, 2010; Nisbet & Myers, 2007; Olausson, 
2009), international trade (Zhu & Wang, 2017), and regional collaboration (Semetko & 
Valkenburg, 2000) were also depicted differently for different publics.   
In other words, the same event may be regarded as troublesome and problematic 
by some information sources, but may be played at a lower or even opposite key by other 
sources. Previous studies naturally compared different portrayals between the media from 
different countries, thus the fundamental assumption is that national boundaries fragment 
the media landscape because media from different countries have national identities 
which would influence how they portrayal events.  
Scholars expected that the differences in these portrayals to have distinct effects 
on publics’ behavior or intentions (Entman, 1991; Nisbet & Myers, 2007; Y. Zhu & 
Wang, 2017). However, there is still little evidence of this link. The current chapter 
conceptualizes such distinct effects as the different extents to which the publics considers 
the issue at stake a “problem”. In other words, the current examination hypothesizes that 
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credibility and dependency of foreign and domestic media would have different effects 
on publics’ activeness, especially when accessibility to these types of media are different.  
Therefore, the three psychological antecedents of communicative actions 
proposed by Kim and Grunig (2011) are used as dependent variables. According to Kim 
and Grunig, whether an issue is worth of action for the publics depends on their 1) 
problem recognition; 2) constraint recognition and 3) involvement recognition. Problem 
recognition refers to whether the publics consider the issue as problematic, or do the 
publics see a gap between the status quo and an ideal scenario. Constraint recognition 
means to what extent do publics consider they are restricted by objective conditions to act 
about the issue. Involvement recognition means to what extent publics consider 
themselves as involved or connected to the issue or the consequences of it.  
It is worth attention that these psychological antecedents are usually used as 
exogenous variables in other empirical models explaining communicative behavior, thus 
they are conceptually covarying (a person with high problem recognition tends to also 
have high involvement recognition). Thus, one of the challenges that this study faces is 
the discriminant validity between problem recognition, involvement recognition, and 
constraint recognition.  
4.3 Media Dependency and Activeness 
Although it is now hypothesized that access to foreign media and domestic media 
would have different effects on the psychological antecedents of the publics’ activeness, 
the actual mechanism remains unexplored. For example, would access to foreign media 
increase problem recognition, decrease constraint recognition, and increase involvement 
recognition? And would domestic media do the same or the reverse? 
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To answer the first question, literature on foreign media’s influence on domestic 
publics’ cognition, attitude and behavior about certain issue of problem have given this 
study abundant support. For example, (Snyder, Roser, & Chaffee, 1991) found that 
access and reliance on foreign media are significant promoters behind people’s intention 
to emigrate, (Golan & Kiousis, 2010) found that credibility of international media 
promotes suppresses democratic values among the observed Arabic population. The 
positive relationship between foreign media use and increase of materialist thoughts was 
also examined (Zhu & He, 2002). Many other studies have showed similar results 
supporting the point that a person’s relationship with foreign media significantly 
increased his/her awareness about the issue, and in certain cases, lead to behaviors to 
change the status quo.  
To answer the second question of whether foreign media and domestic media 
would produce similar or conflicting effects, there is need to review some existing 
research and examples. First of all, whether or not an issue is a conflict determinant 
should be considered. Because public diplomacy ultimately hopes to benefit the 
perception and/or adoptions of government policies, attitudes, cultural values abroad. For 
example, Zhu and Wang (2017) analyzed how Latin American newspapers portrayed 
Chinese OFDI (i.e. outward foreign direct investment) in the region, and found that 
different national interests were a factor that influences the portrayal. Simply put, if a 
country could be potentially benefitted by Chinese OFDI (which is a strategic 
advancement decided by the Chinese policy, and analyzed by governmental sources 
quoted in media), then newspapers within that country would comparatively portray the 
OFDI as a positive thing, despite domestic partisanship. 
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Thus, it is reasonable to argue that the effects of foreign/domestic media 
dependencies on publics’ activeness could be situational, partially depending on to what 
extent the two states differ, or have conflict, in a certain issue. However, as other research 
showed (Semetko & Valkenberg, 2000) not only does conflict play a part: even if 
governments have similar interests in an issue (the unification of the Euro currency), 
media from different countries would still differ in the focus of the issue. These different 
foci would possibly influence people’s constraint or involvement recognition in distinct 
ways and to distinct extents. For example, if currency unification is an international trade 
problem, then fewer people would have high levels of involvement, in comparison to 
when currency unification is framed as a problem of local employment.  
This is to say that the framing and agenda-setting functions of media cause 
differences in people’s general activeness. And in this chapter the differences in framing 
and agenda-setting (of the same issue) between media from different countries have 
already been explained. Thus, a hypothetical comparison of the effects of foreign vs. 
domestic media dependency on activeness should consider the conflict of interest in the 
following areas: problem prevalence (corresponding to problem recognition), level of 
expected arousal (corresponding to constraint recognition), and amplitude (corresponding 
to involvement recognition).  
Simply put, when monitoring publics’ activeness, researchers and practitioners 
should understand the content of a possible, although not necessarily, rival media. The 
content of the media gains its power through people’s dependency on the media. This 
chapter then, proposes the following model (Figure 4.1) to test whether foreign media 
and domestic media (in the case of China) have different effects on publics’ activeness 
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about an issue. To focus this inquiry, this chapter continues the thematic focus of the 
previous chapter, which is air quality in China.  
As discussed in previous chapters, air quality was chosen as the problem for 
Chinese citizens given its omnipresence in China: nearly all provinces in China have air 
pollution to varying extents. However, air quality is perhaps not a conflict determinant 
topic between foreign and domestic media, meaning that the general tone of news from 
foreign and domestic is not expected to be very different. Also, as explained in earlier 
chapter, using an actual conflict determinant topic is difficult for a survey conducted in 
China: for example, asking about the “abuse of human rights” in China as a problem 
(which is a conflict determinant) would be unacceptable for local survey companies, 
given the fact that they have to follow Chinese laws when doing business. Given these 





Figure 4.1 Media Dependency Leading to Psychological Activation 
 
H4: Media dependency positively influences problem recognition about 
air pollution. 
H4a: Foreign media dependency positively influences problem 
recognition 
H4b: Domestic media dependency positively influences problem 
recognition 
H5: Media dependency positively influences involvement recognition 
about air pollution. 
H5a: Foreign media dependency positively influences 
involvement recognition 
H5b: Domestic media dependency positively influences 
involvement recognition 
H6: Media dependency negatively influences constraint recognition 
about air pollution. 
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H6a: Foreign media dependency negatively influences constraint 
recognition. 




CHAPTER 5. METHOD  
Chapter III and Chapter IV of this dissertation proposed several hypotheses based 
on the grand-level theorizations in Chapter II. The current chapter introduces and 
explains how psychometric models in Chapter III and IV are tested, detailing the  data 
collection method, operationalization of variables, and data analysis strategies. More 
specifically, this chapter explains why the survey method is the most suitable for the 
current empirical examinations, and how the survey is constructed to operationalize the 
psychometric variables. Lastly, it explains how the data are analyzed to yield theoretical 
implications.  
5.1 Choice of Data Collection Method 
Although chapter II has incorporated a series of country-level and individual-level 
variables in the process of theory building, this dissertation, in its current form, only has 
the time and space for the analysis of individual-level variables. In other words, the 
empirical part of the current dissertation is focused on the psychological antecedents and 
results of public diplomacy activities. It is true that chapter III discussed how government 
interference could have its impact on how foreign media credibility is perceived. 
However, chapter III’s conceptualization of governmental interference as a variable is 
based on perception as well. This means that, while there are many possible 
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conceptualizations and thus ways to operationalize “government interference” 
(e.g. an actual quantitative measurement on government policies, the trend in official 
discourse about information control, etc.), the choice is to focus on the perception of 
information access (discussed in chapter III) as a public perception of the effects of 
governmental control of information. 
The logic here is that chapter III already discussed different types of information 
access problems in China. It is arguable that government control of information cannot be 
easily equated to the perception of information access, because government control could 
be only one of the reasons of public’s perception of a low information accessibility. For 
example, as discussed in Chapter III, a person in China may feel that access to foreign 
media is scarce because of a) the scarce knowledge in new information technology, b) the 
lack of public infrastructure necessary for the reception of foreign media content, and/or 
c) policies that restrict foreign media access. Thus, we need to control for the former two 
reasons and focus on the last reason: policy-based controls of information access. The 
variable conceptualization section further discusses how exactly these are controlled. As 
for now, the point is that all of the variables in the models are individual-level 
psychometric variables.  
Chapter III and Chapter IV have clear inclinations towards a quantitative strategy 
in terms of model building. However, it is still necessary to explain why this is the case. 
The public diplomacy literature has an abundant volume of studies focusing on pure 
theory building by qualitative terms. For international relations scholars, public 
diplomacy is often discussed with country-level factors such as soft power, hard power, 
ideology, government type, culture, economic abilities, and so on. However, very few 
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studies have been able to generalize theories with quantitative measurements of these 
variables. One reason is that many of these concepts are internally flawed and are still 
questionable at the stage of conceptualization; the other reason might be that 
governments’ public diplomacy practices differ. These two reasons can be speculated 
from critics to the existence of soft power (Baldwin, 2016) and the public diplomacy case 
studies which provide often conflicting theoretical implications. 
The innovations of chapter II include, firstly, a focus on publics as the ultimate 
goal of public diplomacy. The publics, or the publics actors in public diplomacy, are not a 
means (public opinion) to an end (national interests), they are but national interest per se. 
This means that publics’ thoughts are national interest just like natural resources, borders, 
economic reserves, military equipment, and so on. Secondly, the power ecology between 
a state actor and mediating actors at the domestic and international levels is a collection 
of relationships built by the governments’ hope to protect or expand their national 
interest (public’s thoughts). Thus, psychological inclinations of the publics should not be 
treated as results of governments’ public diplomacy campaigns around the world, but the 
fundamental raison d’etre of public diplomacy. For foreign publics’ thoughts and 
psychological inclinations facilitate the ability of the acting government to procure 
resources and economic means of acting in its interests: furthering national goals and its 
values around the world. 
At this point, it should be clear that psychological traits are the focus of this 
dissertation. The next question is how they can be empirically observed and analyzed. 
Social scientists have developed a number of methodologies to do so: anthropological 
fieldwork, interviews, focus groups, survey and big data analysis. That said, 
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ethnographical and naturalistic approaches may require a much longer time for fieldwork, 
and their focus is usually on grounding new theories. Focus groups could be a good way 
to get psychological insights, however, they do not provide data for quantitative 
modelling, which is essential to test the links in the ecological and competition models in 
Chapter II. This dissertation adopts survey as the data collection method, this is because 
survey data can provide a more coverage and more generalizability given the same 
amount of resource and time.  
5.2 Operationalization of Variables 
Foreign and Domestic Media Credibility  
As Gunther (1992) pointed out, the perception of media credibility can be 
situational for a person given different themes, times and platforms. Thus, the current 
dissertation decides to anchor such perception at a given theme and moment and adopt a 
multi-item measurement for different types of media platforms. The questions will ask 
respondents in China to evaluate the media credibility in terms of news about air quality 
in China. 
Before asking the questions, the respondents will first read a definition of foreign 
media: which is defined as internationally well-known media organizations (newspapers, 
magazines, TV or radio companies, online news websites, and international news 
agencies such as AP, AFP, Reuters) that are not headquartered in mainland China, but in 
countries and regions such as US, UK, Japan, etc. Then they will answer eight questions 
related to two different facets of media credibility: believability and affiliation (Wanta & 
Hu, 1994). The questions can be seen in Appendix A. It is worth mentioning that the first 
item used by previous researchers to measure believability (i.e. [name of media] does not 
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try to manipulate local opinion) was forbidden by censorship officers from the Chinese 
survey platform. Thus, believability was measured only using the remaining four items. 
All five items measuring affiliation were used. 
Then the respondents will answer nine similar questions again, but in relation to 
domestic media, whose definition will be shown to the respondents: domestic media 
means media organizations that are headquartered inside mainland China (newspapers, 
magazines, TV or radio companies/stations) at both the national, provincial or municipal 
level.  
Foreign and Domestic Media Accessibility  
This variable is conceptualized as policy accessibility of a given media, and the 
rationale for this has been explained in chapter III. Although much literature is available 
on how to measure exposure, media use or reliance to foreign media in the Chinese 
context, little research has been done in Chin directly asking respondents for their 
perceptions about foreign media accessibility. Because of this, the current study focused 
on the Chinese public’s perception of how easily they and other citizens can access 
foreign media, how available these foreign media contents are, and whether the person’s 
social environment facilitates foreign media access. All of these items are conceptualized 
to ensure that governmental policy can have strong impact on the respondents’ answers. 
The actual scale can be seen in Appendix A. 
Media System Dependency for Understanding 
Survey measurements of media system dependencies at the individual level were 
developed and consolidated by Ball-Rokeach and DeFleur (1976) and Grant (1991, 
1996). The original 18 items measure three established components of media 
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dependency: understanding, orientation and play. Each of these represents a media 
function that the individuals depend on in their daily lives. For the current dissertation, 
one of the focuses is on how public diplomacy influences the way people understand the 
society and then react to it with such understanding. Thus, currently only the 
understanding and the orientation facets of media dependency is used. This composite, 
namely “media dependency for understanding and orientation”, is measured using the 
twelve corresponding items in previous works. For simplicity, it will be termed as just 
dependency or media dependency hereafter. The items are statements of daily tasks of 
media functions, and the respondents are asked to rate how much they rely on foreign or 
domestic media by selecting the degree of helpfulness (1= not at all, 7= extremely). Thus, 
in total there are two composites measured: dependency on foreign media and 
dependency on domestic media, each containing six items.  
Antecedent Variables of Communicative Actions 
The previous three variable sets focus on the relationship between governmental 
interference (accessibility), perception of media credibility, and people’s dependence on 
foreign and domestic media. The next step is to connect these psychological traits with 
psychological antecedents of people’s communicative actions. This is because this 
dissertation hopes to find out whether relationship with foreign and domestic media, 
under the influence of governmental policies, could influence how people communicate 
about important social problems (in this case air quality in China).  
The situational theory of problem solving from the field of public relations 
informs the operationalization of this variable set. The theory explains people’s 
communicative patterns by looking at how people conceptualize social phenomena: Kim 
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and Grunig (2011) have discussed extensively how problem recognition, constraint 
recognition and involvement recognition influence people’s communicative behavior 
about a social problem.  
After consulting the proposers of the STOPS model, our measures of these three 
constructs (problem recognition, constraint recognition and involvement recognition) 
were adopted from the 2010 Kim’s study (Kim, Grunig, & Ni, 2010) and 2011 Kim & 
Grunig’s study (Kim & Grunig, 2011). Measurement items were carefully selected from 
the original list of items obtained in order to: 1. Ensure that the items are unambiguous 
and easy to comprehend and 2.  avoid multiple negatives, double-barreled sentences, 
ambiguous pronoun references, and misplaced modifiers (Netemeyer, Bearden, & 
Sharma, 2003). For example, under constraint recognition, more government-related 
items were selected in order to generate more face validity. The questionnaire used a 
unidimensional 7-point scale in all items of STOPS model: this is in line with most of the 
STOPS studies and most importantly, with the proposers of the STOPS models (see Kim 
2010 for more explication on the choice). Every item asked respondents to indicate their 
level of agreement from absence of agreement (Not at all) to full agreement (absolutely). 
The finalized items can be seen in Appendix A. 
Translation of Questionnaire 
As mentioned above, the questionnaire includes survey questions to represent the 
operationalized variables. This questionnaire (shown in Appendix A) was created in 
English, and were translated into Mandarin Chinese (simplified). The translation process 
was done by the author, who worked as a professionally trained translator and interpreter. 
After translation, the translated questionnaire was examined by five native Mandarin 
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speakers who currently reside in China to check for any grammatical error or 
inappropriate use of words and phrases. The finalized Chinese version of the 
questionnaire can be seen in Appendix B. 
 
5.3 Stabilization of Scales: Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
Why a confirmatory factor analysis is needed. 
With the demographic variables discussed above, the next step is to conduct a 
confirmatory factor analysis (henceforth CFA), and there are two reasons why a CFA is 
needed before we conduct any further analysis of path models and structural equation 
modelling (i.e. SEM).  
The first is that, based on previous literature on media and information 
accessibility, the current dissertation created a new composite measurement of media 
accessibility in the context of foreign vs. domestic media competition. This new 
composite psychometric measurement needs achieve reliability within itself and 
discriminant validity against other variables in our path models and SEM.  
The second reason is that all variables, even if they derive from previous 
measurements that have been successfully applied in international communication 
research, need to achieve reliability, convergent validity, and discriminant validity in the 
current context. Using measures of Composite Reliability (CR), Average Variance 
Extracted (AVE), Maximum Shared Variance (MSV) and Average Shared Variance 
(ASV) as key parameters, the dissertation examined these with thresholds and rules 
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proposed by Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson & Tatham (2010) and Malhotra & Dash 
(2011).  
Exploratory Factor Analysis as Preparation 
 Before CFA, an exploratory factor analysis (henceforth EFA) was performed on 
the items measuring latent variables. This is because that although some latent variables 
(e.g. media believability and media affinity) have discriminant validity in previous 
studies, it is more secure to ensure that this is also true in the current dataset. Given the 
path models and SEM models proposed in chapter III and chapter IV, the following latent 
variables and their indicators were taken into the EFA: foreign and domestic media 
accessibility, foreign and domestic media believability, foreign and domestic media 
affinity, foreign and domestic media dependency, problem recognition, involvement 
recognition and constraint recognition.  
The current study adopted Principal Component Analysis for factor extraction 
(using a minimum eigenvalue = 1.0 as cutoff), and given that some of the latent variables 
are known to be correlated (e.g. media believability and media affinity), Promax (an 
oblique rotation method for large datasets) rotation was adopted. This first attempt 
yielded not 11 (expected), but 9 factors. It showed that media believability tends to 
always rotate together with media affinity, and the EFA also identified items in problem 
recognition, involvement recognition and constraint recognition that had cross-loadings 
among the three factors. After careful consideration, media affinity and media 
believability were included under a 2nd-level latent factor named media credibility. Items 
4 of problem recognition, and Items 1, 2 of involvement recognition and constraint 
recognition were removed from list.  
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The second EFA yielded better results: the analysis yielded a KMO & Bartlett’s 
test result of .902 in terms of sample accuracy, and all of the communality readings were 
above .60. The EFA yielded 9 factors (exactly the expected number of factors after 
combining foreign/domestic media affinity and media believability) explaining 72.43% of 
the variance, the redundant residuals were less than 7% percent. As an initial evidence of 
convergent validity, all the indicators have a loading above .68 onto their respective 
factors, with no strong cross-loadings above 0.3 level (initial evidence of discriminant 
validity). The factor correlation matrix did not show anything above .60 among non-
diagonal readings. Thus, the factors were stabilized for further examination in the CFA 
process.  
Obtaining Good Model Fit 
The first step for the CFA is to check the model fit indexes. To judge model 
viability, the current study also applied the Hu and Bentler (1999) joint-criteria approach: 
A model was considered viable when it achieved Comparative Fit Index (CFI) ≥ .96 and 
SRMR ≤ .10 or Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) ≤ .06 and SRMR 
≤ .10. These indexes will also be applied to the evaluation of the final SEM model.  
After the pattern matrix from the EFA was transcribed into SPSS Amos (ver.24), 
two 2nd-level latent variables were created on top of media affinity and media 
believability. This is in accordance to both previous theory (Wanta and Hu, 1994) and the 
result of the EFA. The 2nd-level latent variables were named foreign media credibility 
and domestic media credibility. Initial CFA has a CFI = .925, with unacceptable RMSEA 
and PCLOSE (p value testing the null hypothesis that RMSEA is less than .05 in the 
population) readings.  
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First the loadings of each indicator on its latent variable were examined to make 
sure there were no extremely low loadings, then according to theory, some errors were 
correlated with their counterparts among indicators of another latent variable. For 
example, error terms of media affinity and believability, and foreign and domestic media 
accessibility were correlated. Some other indicators were dropped from a factor because 
it shared much variance with a series of other variables. After this process, Table 5.1 
shows the indicators retained for each item, and with the exact indicators and items in 
Table 5.1, the CFA model has a CFI = .935, RMSEA = .048, PCLOSE = .797 and SRMR 
= .047. All indicators showing that the model has a good fit, the proposed model fits the 
estimated model in terms of major correlations inherent in the dataset.  
Validity and Reliability Tests 
Using the above-mentioned CFA model, the correlation matrix of all the latent 
variables in the model were produced, with Composite Reliability (CR), Average 
Variance Extracted (AVE), Maximum Shared Variance (MSV) and Average Shared 
Variance (ASV) calculated. Two discriminant validity issues emerged for problem 
recognition’s discriminant validity against involvement recognition. Actually, as Kim 
(2010) and Kim and Grunig (2011) explained when they developed the cognition 
measurement, the discriminant validity among the three recognition variables may vary 
depending on the actual topic of the “problem”. Given that the problem presented to the 
respondents was air pollution, it is reasonable to assume that most citizens, as long as 
they need to breathe, would feel involved with the problem if they think it is a problem. 
Which means that problem recognition and involvement recognition are likely to covary 
in the current context.  
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my social environment facilitates me to access foreign online news media 3.70 1.67
people around me usually have access to foreign online news media 3.65 1.67
foreign online news media contents are readily available in my life 3.75 1.67
5.31 1.64
It is easy for me to access domestic online news media 5.31 1.66
people around me usually have access to domestic online news media 5.22 1.63
domestic online news media contents are readily available in my life 5.41 1.63
3.74 1.50
foreign media orgs get facts accurately. 3.95 1.45
foreign media orgs deal fairly with all sides of political or social issue. 3.69 1.50
foreign media orgs separate facts from opinions. 4.09 1.38
foreign media orgs is generally not biased. 3.43 1.59
foreign media orgs are concerned with my community’s well-being 3.24 1.61
foreign media orgs are concerned about the public welfare for my people 3.75 1.52
foreign media orgs report socially meaningful stories 4.01 1.45
4.39 1.44
domestic media orgs get facts accurately. 4.50 1.35
domestic media orgs deal fairly with all sides of political or social issue. 4.17 1.44
domestic media orgs separate facts from opinions. 4.27 1.40
domestic media orgs are concerned with my community’s well-being 4.28 1.51
domestic media orgs are concerned about the public welfare for my people 4.54 1.49
domestic media orgs report socially meaningful stories 4.72 1.38
domestic media orgs are in touch with average Chinese people 4.27 1.53
3.76 1.18
Gain insight into why you do some of the things you do
Observe how others cope with problems or situations like yours
Keep up with world events
Stay on top of what is happening in the community
Imagine what you'll be like when you grow older
Find out how the country is doing
Decide where to go for services such as health, financial, or household
Figure out what to buy
Plan where to go for evening and weekend activities
Discover better ways to communicate with others
Think about how to act with friends, relatives, or people you work with
Get ideas about how to approach others in important or difficult situations
4.57 1.04
Same as above, but focused on domestic media 0.916
5.57 1.37
I think air pollution is a serious social (or national) problem. 5.82 1.44
I am concerned about air pollution a lot. 5.48 1.38
About air pollution, I see a huge gap between what it should be and what it is now. 5.17 1.35
Something needs to be done to improve air pollution. 5.81 1.31
3.84 1.63
I find no obstacles in doing something for air pollution. 3.22 1.49
I feel I can improve the problematic situation of air pollution. 4.12 1.64
I feel that my ideas or opinion matter to those who are addressing air pollution. 4.18 1.75
5.39 1.38
Air pollution has serious consequences for my life and someone I care. 5.53 1.38
I am connected with air pollution and its consequences. 5.28 1.33
I think air pollution could affect me personally. 5.35 1.43













Perceived Foreign Media Dependency




Perceived Foreign Media Accessibility
Perceived Domestic Media Accessibility
Perceived Foreign Media Credibility







Table 5.2 Check for Reliability, Discriminant Validity and Convergent Validity 
 
 
 CR AVE MSV MaxR(H)
Factor 
Code
A* B C D E F G H I
Credibility of 
Foreign Media A 0.889 0.801 0.527 0.908 0.895
Dependency on 
Foreign Media B 0.864 0.614 0.527 0.866 0.726 0.783
Dependency on 
Domestic Media C 0.873 0.581 0.349 0.883 0.360 0.560 0.762
Accessibility of 
Foreign Media D 0.892 0.734 0.152 0.894 0.135 -0.059 0.201 0.857
Accessibility of 
Domestic Media E 0.845 0.646 0.283 0.848 0.532 0.529 0.232 0.155 0.803
Problem 
Recognition F 0.840 0.570 0.457 0.856 0.050 -0.072 0.168 0.390 0.042 0.755
Constraint 
Recognition G 0.792 0.567 0.256 0.845 -0.373 -0.506 -0.464 -0.062 -0.393 -0.051 0.753
Credibility of 
Domestic Media H 0.860 0.757 0.349 0.918 0.386 0.308 0.591 0.316 0.285 0.195 -0.445 0.870
Involvement 
Recognition I 0.843 0.642 0.457 0.844 0.093 0.113 0.303 0.291 0.046 0.676 -0.218 0.279 0.801
Table 5.2 Check for Reliability, Discriminant Validity and Convergent Validity
Note: Composite Reliability (CR), Average Variance Extracted (AVE), Maximum Shared Variance (MSV), and Max Reliability (MaxR)
         *The bolded number on the diagonal line is the root of AVE for each factor, then it is compared with any of the inter-factor correlation beneath it. 
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Thus, given this theoretical support, error terms of items 3 in involvement 
recognition and item 5 in problem recognition were covaried. With this improvement, 
model fit was improved (CFI = .943, RMSEA = .048, PCLOSE = .827, SRMR = .045).  
Then, the correlation matrix of all the latent variables and relevant parameters 
were requested and calculated again. Table 5.2 shows the final correlation matrix and 
relevant CR, AVE, MSV and ASV readings. The results demonstrate that the latent 
variables pass the tests of reliability, convergent validity and discriminant validity.  
5.4 SEM Specification and Identification 
Model Specification and Illustration 
After the latent variables were stabilized in terms of their indicators, reliability 
and validity, variables were created from averaged scores of the indicators retained in 
the SEM analysis. Although detailed hypotheses and models were already explained in 
Chapter III and Chapter IV, it is necessary to explain why structural equation modelling 
was chosen as the modeling strategy instead of other similar types of variance- or 
covariance-based multivariate analysis methods.  
First of all, an important feature of the current dissertation is that it is a structural-
functionalist reorganization of existing theories in public diplomacy and international 
political communication. This means that it is concerned with the relationship of the 
actors and their influences on each other. Thus, a multiple regression, as Zhu and He 
(2002) did in their study, would be insufficient to explore the relationship between 
“independent variables”, because in a multiple regression, much of the directionalities 
between variables is invisible. For example, including media accessibility as an indicator 
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of perception of governmental control on information resource, the first set of models in 
Chapter III hopes to study governmental influence on media credibility perception. Thus, 
the direction here is from government to citizens, not the other way around.  
Since variables such as perception of media credibility require model comparisons 
to test some of the hypotheses in Chapter III and Chapter IV, the analytical strategy is: 
the dissertation will first test model in figure 5.1 (the same as figure 3.1) proposed in 
Chapter III. And once the initial model and hypotheses testing for Chapter III is done and 
the competitive relationship between foreign media and domestic media is confirmed, a 
post hoc analysis will be done on the model in figure 5.1 to determine if there are any 
missing links that were ignored. 
 




If there is theoretical support to supplement the original model with extra links, 
these links will be added to the model and the model will be reevaluated in the post hoc 
analysis. This process will yield a final model for hypotheses in chapter III, which will 
then be used in the model testing for chapter IV hypotheses.   
The next step is to combine the models in chapter III and chapter IV using media 
dependency variables (Grant, 1996)  (dependency on foreign media and dependency on 
domestic media) as mediators to behavioral antecedents, namely problem recognition, 
involvement recognition and constraint recognition (Kim and Grunig, 2011). For the 
initial test, the possible loop between the two types of dependencies (on either foreign or 
domestic media) is not allowed to maintain the simplicity of the model. After all, 
theoretical discussion about competition between different types of system dependencies 
goes beyond the scope of this dissertation. In sum, the model shown in the following 
figure will be tested as the final model, as a combination of the theoretical arguments and 
hypotheses in chapter III and chapter IV. 
Covarying Error Terms of Latent Variables 
Covariance of error terms of endogenous variables in SEM has been explained by 
statisticians. In the models proposed by the current chapter, it is important to mention the 
necessity to covary error terms of some of endogenous variables and justify why they 
should be covaried.  
First of all, as can be seen in both figure 5.1 and figure 5.2, the models were 





Figure 5.2 Final Model 
 
theoretically, variables in the same block tends to be spurred by a common latent 
variable. For example, numerous studies found that dependencies on different types of 
media are positively correlated. This shows the possibility that either foreign media 
dependency or domestic media dependency is a part of people’s general dependency on 
all media.  
This means that although the model expects them to be different constructs, their 
error terms (the variance that cannot be explained by distinguishing foreign from 
domestic) are very likely to be spurred by a common latent variable of general media 
dependency, which is not observed by the indicators in our questionnaire. This same 
rationale applies for variables in the media credibility block, however, both model 1 and 
model 2 already hypothesized direct interactions between foreign credibility and 
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domestic credibility, thus their shared variance is already considered in the model. 
Therefore, in these two models, the error terms between foreign media dependency and 
domestic media dependency will be proposed as covarying.  
As for the variables in the communicative behavior antecedent block (see figure 
5.2), previous study on the STOPS model have predominantly treated these as exogenous 
variables, and thus they are theoretically hypothesized as covarying. Considering that 
they usually covary and constitutes to a common latent factor called situational 
motivation in previous models, in the current study their error terms will be proposed as 
covarying.  
That said, it is important to remember that this study does NOT covary any error 
terms across blocks: so far, theoretical support is evident only for errors covarying within 
a block, and the ultimate purpose of this dissertation is to illustrate 1) the interactions 
between different blocks of variables and 2) the comparison of psychometric effects of 
foreign v.s. domestic media, when controlling for their common variance.  
Model Identification 
Now the next step is to make sure model 1 (figure 5.1) and model 2 (figure 5.2) 
are identified models that can be analyzed using SEM strategy. For model 1, because 
there is a non-recursive block (i.e. loop between credibility of foreign media and 
credibility of domestic media), it is necessary to evaluate whether the model is rank-
identified. Kline (2016) proposed a simple way to do this by constructing a system 
matrix. After following this method, it is known that model 1 satisfies the rank condition 
since every endogenous variable has a rank number equal to the total number of 






, v = number of latent variables in the model) and q is the number of estimated 
parameters (including latent variable variances, covariances, and the variances and 
covariances of their residuals). We can calculate that dfModel1 = 6*7/2 –14 = 7. Obviously, 
dfModel1 is larger than zero, making model 1 identified. For model 2, the dfModel2 is 
calculated to be 20. dfModel1 and dfModel2 will later be used to determine sample sizes given 
desired power (refer to the next two sections).  
5.5 Sample 
Sampling 
Althogh Chapter II proposed an inclusive theory to explain public diplomacy 
phenomena around the world, Chapter III and Chapter IV explained that the current 
empirical analysis will be focusing on testing the psychological model in the Chinese 
context. Thus, gaining access to a representative Chinese sample for survey research is 
critical. Given the political and social conditions in China, previous studies gathering 
survey data in China usually did so by either collaborating with a Chinese research 
institution or using a qualified Chinese market research firm. This dissertation chooses 
the second option by contracting with Baidu MTC to recruit respondents. Baidu is not 
only the largest search engine in China with around 870 million users, but is also able to 
provide advanced solutions for higher requirements of respondent demographics. 
Moreover, IRB approval was sought and granted before data collection. 
However, recruiting a representative national sample out of the vast Chinese 
population requires a more precise definition of representativeness in the first place: 
previous studies having Chinese respondents usually choose to focus on some particular 
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demographics in accordance with their thematic and theoretical focus. Zhu and He (1994) 
and other studies researching Chinese’s reception of foreign media have found several 
demographic variables that are influential to the effect of international political 
communication: education, age, party membership, type of residency (i.e. whether a 
person lives in metropolitan areas or in the less-developed areas). Thus, the sampling of 
our respondents will require the sampling company to recruit a quota sample mimicking 
the national statistics of the demographics mentioned above.  
The sampling process was initiated with collaboration of the Chinese survey firm 
Sojump on Janurary 28th, 2018. To ensure the balance of risk and benefit for the 
respondents, they received local currency equivalent to 1.5-2.5 USD after completing the 
survey voluntarily.  
Sample Size Determination and A Priori Power 
At this point, it is necessary to explain how this dissertation determined a suitable 
sample size for the empirical tests. The responses gathered by Sojump have two primary 
characteristics: first, they are survey data and thus should be considered in terms of 
survey sample size requirements to achieve acceptably small levels of margin of error; 
second, they are designed to be analyzed in a structural equation model, this means that 
sample size considerations for SEM were also taken into account.  
In terms of defining sample sizes for surveys, its influence on standard errors of 
statistics has been an important concern. However, Groves et al. (2004, p. 381) have the 
following arguments: first of all, sample size is only one of the elements that influences, 
the stratification, clustering and assignment of probabilities of selection are all at play 
when it comes to standard errors; secondly, they mentioned that the standard error should 
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be considered relative to the hypothetical decisions to be made. In other words, the 
researcher needs to make compromises about standard error when its increase would have 
little effect on the hypothetical decisions.  
In the current dissertation, if the actual value of “foreign media credibility” is X 
and the ideal measured value is “0.9X”, suppose that with a smaller sample size the 
measured value is “0.8X”. The “0.8X”, in comparison to “0.9X”, does not necessarily 
endanger the dissertation’s hypothetical decisions: what the dissertation is trying to 
compared is not whether foreign or domestic media credibility have higher influences on 
exogenous variables, but that their influences are directionally different.  
It is somehow common sense in research method textbooks that for a nationally 
representative sample, or for any sample to get publication-wise tolerable margin of error, 
the ideal sample size would be around 1,000-1,200 (Babbie, 2015). However, as 
mentioned earlier, this dissertation does not intend to empirically test the models on the 
whole Chinese population, but is rather interested in key populations meaningful to 
public diplomacy: who are educated, have a baseline socio-political status, and can 
possibly participate in the expressions of public opinions5.  Moreover, the budget of the 
current survey is limited, resulting in limited abilities to gain large sample size.  
Another necessary consideration when determining sample size is statistical 
power. Power, instead, does not pertain to the differentiation of data collection methods 
like survey or content analysis. How to use power analysis to determine a minimum 
                                                 
5 The empirical tests are only concerned with these demographics for now. There are other types of public 
diplomacy phenomena that also fit into the theoretical models in Chapter II, such as foreign-aided militia, 
terrorist groups, or underground rebel groups. Identifying possible populations that contain such groups are 
extremely difficult and could suffer from political surveillance. This dissertation does not have enough 
resources to go further into this direction.  
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sample size is more related to the statistical test itself. Since the final step of the modeling 
strategy is structural equation modeling, the power analysis here should consult relevant 
literature in SEM methodology.  
Kline (2016), however, mentioned two considerations of sample sizes of SEM 
analysis: the first one is the number of cases needed for statistical precision: Kline (2016, 
p. 16) mentioned a heuristic proposed by Jackson (2003), which is the N:q rule. It is 
suggested that the N (number of cases): q (number of parameters needing estimation) to 
be ideally 20:1, or at least 10:1. Earlier discussions already show that q is 27 for both 
model 1 and model 2, thus, the N:q rule would require a minimum sample size of 540.  
However, the N:q rule is only a rough way to estimate minimum sample size. 
Kline (2016, p. 291) also introduced a method to estimate sample size given the desired 
power level. Two types of minimum sample size (close-fit and not-close-fit null 
hypothesis of RMSEA) could be computed given α level (usually .05), degree of freedom 
of the model (dfM), ε0 (null hypothesis of RMSEA, either close-fit or not-close-fit) and ε1 
(alternative hypothesis of RMSEA, usually set as ε1 = .08 for close-fit ε0 ≤ .05, and ε1 
= .01 for not-close-fit ε0 ≥ .05) (MacCallum, Browne, and Sugawara, 1996; Preacher and 
Coffman, 2006). Fortunately, Preacher and Coffman (2006) developed an online tool 
which generate R codes that can be simultaneously executed to calculate minimum 
sample size. Since dfModel1 and dfModel2 are both 18, the minimum sample size for the two 
models are the same after estimation. Because the N:q rule suggested a sample size of 
540, we also computed the power at N = 540. Table 5.3 shows the results of this power 
analysis.   
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Thus, we can see that when N=540, the model’s a priori power is at a good level 
of .83 (not-close-fit) and .85 (close-fit). And the minimum sample size is around 500. It is 
then reasonable to set 540 responses as the goal of sample collection. 
Table 5.3 Power Analysis Results 
Power at N = 540 
Close Fita .851 
Not Close Fitb .835 
Minimum N for Power ≥ .80c 
Close Fit 470 
Not Close Fit 510 
Note. dfModel1 and dfModel2 = 20, α = .05. All results were computed using 
Quantpsy (Preacher and Coffman, 2006). 
aH0: ε0 ≤ .05, H1: ε0 = .08 
bH0: ε0 ≥ .05, H1: ε0 = .01 
cSample Size rounded up to closest multiple of 5 
  
Sample Demographics 
The research company collected a total of 572 responses among users of 
Baidu.com in China, the survey was provided to Baidu users on a first-come-first-get 
basis for a cash reward no greater than 15 renminbi (about 2.5 US dollars). The sampling 
frame is 870 million registered users of Baidu.com in China mainland, this means that the 
current sampling frame does not include provincial regions such as Hongkong, Macau 
and Taiwan6.  
                                                 
6 In relevant legislations of either the People’s Republic of China (PRC) or the Republic of China (ROC), 
Taiwan is regarded as a provincial region of the administration. This dissertation has no intention to include 
any analysis, review or debate on these legislations.  
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The 572 respondents reside across 29 provinces (or provincial regions such as 
autonomous region or autonomous cities) out of 31 possible, with no responses collected 
from Xizang province (Tibet province) and Qinghai province. Meanwhile, to ensure that 
the sample is sensitive to the development gaps between metropolitan cities (tier 1), 
provincial capitals (tier-2) and county-level areas (tier 3), quota sampling was adopted to 
ensure that there is a 1:2:2 ratio of respondents from respectively the three tiers. Table 5.4 
shows the geographical distributions of our respondents in terms of their provincial 
residence and tier of residence. It shows that the sample has mimicked a ratio of 1:2:2 in 
terms of development tiers of cities, as well as a geographical balance of the Northern, 
Southern, Eastern and Western part of China in each category.  
Gender-wise, 52.4% of the sample is female, slightly more than male 
respondents. It has a mean age of 30.3 with a standard deviation of 7.2 (range being 19 to 
63). Regarding highest education levels, 2.1% hold middle school diploma, 9.1% hold 
high school diploma, 30.9% hold a 2-year college degree, 50.9% hold a bachelor degree 
and 7.0% hold a master degree or above. Also, because the psychometric model measures 
respondents’ recognition of air quality problem in China, Air Quality Index (i.e. AQI, as 
measured by the Ministry of Environmental Protection of China, the higher it is, the 
worse the air quality) was matched to each respondent according to their residence. The 
AQI recorded in the dataset corresponds to the date of responding the questionnaire of 
each participant (M = 101.1, SD = 53.3). Table 5.4 and Table 5.5 show the details of the 
above-mentioned demographic variables.  To be comparable with the national population 





Table 5.4 Comparison of Demographics 
  
Current Study  
(N = 572) 
2010 Chinese National 
Population Census*  
(in thousands, N 
=133,972) 
Two Sample 
Proportion Test  
(p value) ** 
N % N %   
Gender           
Male 272 48% 68,685 51%   
Female 300 52% 65,287 49%   
Age           
15-19 12 2% 76,215 8%   
20-24 106 19% 99,704 10% 0.06 
25-29 176 31% 128,614 13% 0.00 
30-34 155 27% 104,886 10% 0.00 
35-39 70 12% 92,998 9%   
40-44 22 4% 114,560 11%   
45-49 24 4% 124,891 12%   
50-54 3 1% 104,364 10% 0.05 
55-59 2 0% 80,581 8%   
60-64 2 0% 78,456 8%   
Education           
Illiterate 0 0% 5,466 4% N/A*** 
Primary School 0 0% 35,876 29% N/A 
Middle School 12 2% 51,966 42% 0.00 
High School 229 40% 18,799 15% 0.00 
Bachelor and above 331 58% 11,964 10% 0.00 
Residence           
City 448 78% 66,558 50% 0.00 
Rural 124 22% 67,415 50% 0.00 
            
* Data from the 2010 Tabulation on the 2010 Population Census of the People's Republic of China, available at: 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/pcsj/rkpc/6rp/indexch.htm  
** Tests comparing proportions of two independent samples using z-score; if no p value is reported, then such test was 
not significant at p<.10 level, providing support for small or minimal proportional difference. 




Table 5.5 Comparison of Sample’s Geographical Distribution 
  
Current Study  
(N = 572) 
2010 Chinese National 
Population Census*  
(in thousands, N 
=133,972) 
Two Sample 
Proportion Test  
(p value)** 
N % N %   
Provincial 
Administrations 
          
Beijing 44 7.7% 1,961 1.5% 0.00 
Tianjin 8 1.4% 1,294 1.0%   
Hebei 34 5.9% 7,185 5.4%   
Shanxi 18 3.1% 3,571 2.7%   
Inner Mongolia 1 0.2% 2,471 1.8% 0.00 
Liaoning 29 5.1% 4,375 3.3%   
Jilin 10 1.7% 2,746 2.1%   
Heilongjiang 8 1.4% 3,831 2.9% 0.01 
Shanghai 30 5.2% 2,302 1.7% 0.00 
Jiangsu 30 5.2% 7,866 5.9%   
Zhejiang 33 5.8% 5,443 4.1%   
Anhui 11 1.9% 5,950 4.4% 0.00 
Fujian 11 1.9% 3,689 2.8%   
Jiangxi 5 0.9% 4,457 3.3% 0.00 
Shandong 44 7.7% 9,579 7.2%   
Henan 18 3.1% 9,402 7.0% 0.00 
Hubei 13 2.3% 5,724 4.3% 0.00 
Hunan 4 0.7% 6,568 4.9% 0.00 
Guangdong 61 10.7% 10,430 7.8% 0.07 
Guangxi 29 5.1% 4,603 3.4%   
Hainan 2 0.3% 867 0.7%   
Chongqing 26 4.5% 2,885 2.2% 0.02 
Sichuan 59 10.3% 8,042 6.0% 0.00 
Guizhou 6 1.0% 3,475 2.6% 0.00 
Yunnan 4 0.7% 4,597 3.4% 0.00 
Xizang 0 0.0% 300 0.2% 0.00 
Shaanxi 25 4.4% 3,733 2.8%   
Gansu 5 0.9% 2,558 1.9% 0.02 
Qinghai 0 0.0% 563 0.4% 0.00 
Ningxia 1 0.2% 630 0.5%   
Xinjiang 3 0.5% 2,181 1.6% 0.00 
            
* Data from the 2010 Tabulation on the 2010 Population Census of the People's Republic of China, available at: 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/pcsj/rkpc/6rp/indexch.htm 
** Tests comparing proportions of two independent samples using z-score; if no p value is reported, then such test was 




CHAPTER 6. EMPIRICAL ANALYSES RESULTS 
This chapter reports the hypothesis tests and analyzes the models proposed in 
chapter III and chapter IV, following the modelling and analytical strategies illustrated in 
chapter V for hypotheses testing.  
6.1 Review on Data Analysis Strategy 
The study first conducted a confirmatory factor analysis of all the variables to 
remove low- or cross-loading items and to check for equivalence of factor structures. An 
internal consistency test was also conducted using Cronbach’s Alpha. The analysis 
consisted of a two-step structural equation modeling (Kline, 2016).  
In the first step, the measurement phase, the study analyzed and selected the best 
measurement items for each construct. The study checked for correlated residuals and 
cross-loadings using Lagrange multiplier (LM) tests and removed low-loading items. In 
the second step, the structural phase, this study compared the final confirmatory model 
with the proposed structural models. When necessary, the study respecified the initial 
structural model with applications of the LM test and Wald test (i.e., error covariances).  
To evaluate the proposed structural equation model, the study adopted commonly 
used model fit indices. They are χ2 and its degree of freedom, comparative fit index (CFI), 




residual (SRMR), and Akaike information criterion. Often, χ2 values are sensitive 
to large sample sizes; thus, the χ2 statistic would be significant even if the differences 
between observed data and model-implied covariances were small (Kline, 2016). To 
judge model viability, the current study also applied the Hu and Bentler (1999) joint-
criteria approach: A model was considered viable when it achieved CFI ≥ .96 and SRMR 
≤ .10 or RMSEA ≤ .06 and SRMR ≤ .10. When the test models achieved a reasonable 
model-data fit, the study interpreted their paths to evaluate the hypotheses and research 
questions.  
6.2 Hypotheses Testing for Chapter III 
Chapter III proposed hypotheses 1-3 respectively about 1) the relationships 
between perceived accessibility and perceived media credibility; 2) the mutual effect 
between foreign media credibility and domestic media credibility and 3) the effect of 
media credibility on media dependency.   
In this subsection, the proposed structural equation model in Figure 5.1 is 
examined to test the hypotheses. Because a confirmatory analysis has already been 
performed, at this stage the analysis will directly proceed into the second step of the SEM 
process: testing the full hypothesized model. Using SPSS Amos (ver.24), a path diagram 
representing the model was drawn and the proposed model was estimated. RMSEA 
= .164, PCLOSE = .000, SRMR = .075). These numbers show that there is a significant 
difference between reality and our proposed model. Although it is not meaningful 





Figure 6.1 Hypothses Testing of Model 1 
The original model had poor model fit (χ2 = 114.4, df = 7, p = .000; CFI = .924, 
have a preliminary examination on whether the directionality of the hypotheses was 
correct: using model 1 as the prototype (shown in Figure 6.1), hypotheses 1 and 3 are 
both supported, while the results provide reverse evidence to hypotheses 2a and ab (the 
effect between foreign media credibility and domestic media credibility). While it was 
expected that foreign media credibility would negatively influence domestic media 
credibility, and the latter would positively influence the former, the results shows that 
domestic media credibility has an insignificant, yet negative influence on foreign media 





6.3 Post Hoc Analysis on Model 1 (Chapter III model) 
Given the fact that the originally proposed model 1 does not reflect reality (the 
real distribution of covariances among all latent variables), it is necessary to ameliorate 
model 1 so that hypotheses testing for chapter IV model (model 2) can start on a solid 
basis.  
The first step of the post hoc analysis is checking if there is any excess residual 
covariances between error terms as well as the latent variables. The modification indices 
output from Amos indicated that there were notable excess covariances between 
perceived media accessibility and media dependency. These relationships are considered 
and are accepted, given the fact that accessibility could be directly linked with media 
dependency: in chapter III, they are originally conceptualized as passive reliance and 
active reliance. Thus, it is more than reasonable to expect that a passive phase would lead 
to an active one.  
After consulting literature and finding abundant support, the study argues that the 
addition of these links is not just chasing sampling error, but are theoretically sound links 
that chapter III ignored. Thus, the links from perceived accessibility to domestic media to 
both foreign and domestic media dependency were added, also the link from accessibility 
to foreign media to foreign media dependency was added. Moreover, the insignificant 
path from domestic media credibility to foreign media credibility was removed 
(hypotheses 2b thus not supported), yielding a respecified model 1 shown in the 





Figure 6.2 Respecification of Model 1: Model 1b 
 
After the model1b was respecified, the model was run again and good local model 
fit was achieved (χ2 = 18, df = 5, p = .003; CFI = .991, RMSEA = .067, PCLOSE 
= .167, SRMR = .052). This is to say that given the factors considered in this model at the 
current stage, the model has a good fit with the data. In the current theoretical context, 
this model is able to explain the causal relationships among the variables considered in 
model 1. While H1a, H1b, H3a, H3b are supported, H2 is rejected. The parameter 
estimates and the squared multiple correlations for endogenous variables are shown in 
Table 6.1.  
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At last, a post hoc power analysis was performed to see how much confidence this 
study has in the explained variances of endogenous variables it found out. For all the 
observed R squared of the 4 endogenous variables, the results suggest that all observed R 
squared readings have post hoc statistical power above .99. 
  
Table 6.1 Hypothesis Testing in Model 1 (shown in figure 5.1) 
 
6.4 Hypotheses Testing for Chapter IV 
 Chapter IV proposed hypotheses 7-10 about the relationship between two types of 
media dependency and the three psychological antecedents of public activeness about air 
pollution.  
In this subsection, the proposed structural equation model in Figure 5.2 is 
examined to test the hypotheses. Because a confirmatory analysis has already been 
performed, at this stage the analysis will directly proceed into the second step of the SEM 
process: testing the full hypothesized model. Using SPSS Amos (ver.24), a path diagram 
representing the model was drawn and the proposed model was estimated.  
The original model 2 (see figure 5.2) predicting had mediocre model fit (χ2 = 
120.0, df = 20, p = .000; CFI = .951, RMSEA = .094, PCLOSE = .000, SRMR = .065). 
As for hypotheses 4-6, hypotheses 5a (dependency on foreign media positively influences 










H1a Foreign Media Accessibility Foreign Media Credibility + 0.35 0.54 < .001 Supported
H1b Domestic Media Accessibility Domestic Media Credibility + 0.12 0.23 < .001 Supported
H2a Foreign Media Credibility Domestic Media Credibility - 0.37 0.42 < .001 Rejected
H2b Domestic Media Credibility Foreign Media Credibility + N.S. Rejected
H3a Foreign Media Credibility Foreign Media Dependency + 0.9 0.69 < .001 Supported
H3b Domestic Media Credibility Domestic Media Dependency + 0.8 0.63 < .001 Supported
Table 6.1 Hypothesis Testing in the Model 1 (shown in figure 5.1)
Note: N.S. = Not Significant
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involvement recognition) and 6b (dependency on domestic media reduces constraint 
recognition) were not supported, while all others were supported. 
6.5 Post Hoc Analysis on Model 2 (Chapter III and Chapter IV combined) 
The first step in post-hoc analysis of model 2 is to determine if the modifications 
to model 1b could make model 2 better. After checking the modification indices, the 
identical problems were found for model 2.  
Secondly, the modification indices showed that there are direct relationships 
between perception of domestic media accessibility and problem recognition, as well as 
involvement recognition. This is theoretically sound: if a person thinks there is easy 
access to domestic news about air pollution and such news is abundant, it is more likely 
for him/her to feel the problem and feel involved. It also suggests a direct link between 
perceived domestic media credibility and constraint recognition: while theoretically this 
link is spurred possibly through common trust in domestic media as government 
agencies, and thus government trust, it was added into the respecified model. Moreover, 
perception of access to foreign news about air pollution is linked with constraint 
recognition.  
Thus, model 2 (shown in figure 5.2) was respecified into model 2b (shown in 
Figure 6.3), in the same way by which model 1 was improved into model 1b. The model 
2b was estimated again (Figure 6.3), which achieved great model fit (χ2 = 36.2, df = 15, 
p = .002; CFI = .990, RMSEA = .050, PCLOSE = .475, SRMR = .040). The parameter 
estimates and the squared multiple correlations for endogenous variables are shown in the 
following Table 6.2. At last, a post hoc power analysis was performed to see how much 
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confidence this study has in the explained variances of endogenous variables it found out. 
For all the observed R squared of the 4 endogenous variables, the results suggest that all 
observed R squared readings have post hoc statistical power above .99. 
 
 


























H1a Foreign Media Accessibility Foreign Media Credibility + 0.35 0.54 < .001 Supported
H1b Domestic Media Accessibility Domestic Media Credibility + 0.12 0.23 < .001 Supported
H2a Foreign Media Credibility Domestic Media Credibility - 0.37 0.42 < .001 Rejected
H2b Domestic Media Credibility Foreign Media Credibility + N.S. Rejected
H3a Foreign Media Credibility Foreign Media Dependency + 0.9 0.69 < .001 Supported
H3b Domestic Media Credibility Domestic Media Dependency + 0.8 0.63 < .001 Supported
H4a Foreign Media Dependency Problem Recognition + -0.09 -0.1 .007 Rejected
H4b Domestic Media Dependency Problem Recognition + 0.23 0.21 < .001 Supported
H5a Foreign Media Dependency Involvement Recognition + N.S. Rejected
H5b Domestic Media Dependency Involvement Recognition + 0.34 0.29 < .001 Supported
H6a Foreign Media Dependency Constraint Recognition - -0.27 -0.23 < .001 Supported
H6b Domestic Media Dependency Constraint Recognition - N.S. Rejected
Table 6.2 Hypothesis Testing in the model 2 (shown in figure 5.2)





CHAPTER 7. DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION 
7.1 Important Findings 
This dissertation has several findings that can be highlighted:  
• firstly, it hypothesizes and supports the existence of a passive reliance 
process before the formation of media credibility perception;  
• secondly, it illustrates a way of distinguishing foreign media credibility 
from domestic media credibility, and their respective relations with 
individuals’ dependency on each kind of media;  
• thirdly, it illustrates the different mechanisms by which dependency on 
either foreign or domestic media lead to communicative activeness about a 
social issue. 
• Last but not the least, the dissertation comes up with a new structural-
functionalist theory of public diplomacy as governmental projects.  
The first finding about the passive reliance on media illustrates the importance of 
government policy about media access. Controlling which media citizens can access have 




perspective, can be detrimental to media democratization, but can also be 
necessary for sovereignty from the perspective of more centralized, authoritarian cultures. 
Accessibility to foreign media has a significant, and powerful, positive effect on 
the perceived credibility of foreign media in China. Such link also exists for domestic 
media, yet it is not as strong as the one for foreign media. However, the positive effect of 
credibility perception on media dependency was similarly strong for both foreign and 
domestic media: this illustrates that controlling for media accessibility can effectively 
lead to an indirect control on the level of individual level media dependency.  
It is especially important to note that the results suggest that increased perception 
domestic media access would lead to a reduced individual level dependence on foreign 
media. This is an interesting, but not surprising, finding which may have something to do 
with how Chinese domestic media cut short citizens’ reliance on foreign media.  
Moreover, it was found that foreign media and domestic media creates different 
effects in terms of the psychological activation. Comparing with domestic media, foreign 
media do not relate to people’s involvement recognition, and reduces the extent to which 
respondents think air pollution as a problem. At the same time, foreign media 
dependency has a direct constraint-relieving effect on respondents’ activeness, while 
domestic media does not have.  
7.2 Foreign Media as a Concept: Identification and Credibility 
After a new conceptualization of public diplomacy actors illustrated in chapter II, 
the dissertation zooms in on the particular links that involves the process of governmental 
modification of the effect of “foreign media” on its domestic publics. Chapter III and 
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Chapter IV based their hypotheses on the theoretical assumptions of chapter II: most 
importantly on the assumption that governments would be motivated to modify how 
foreign mediating actors interact with their domestic publics.  
Chapter III already had a detailed discussion on why concepts such as foreign 
media and domestic media were used in the actual empirical analysis, rather than asking 
the respondent questions about a “foreign state actor” or “foreign mediating actor”. The 
reasons are straight forward: publics are not likely to elaborate on questions about the 
ownership or funding of transnational media organizations, and famous transnational 
media seem to be good anchors for ordinary citizens to understand what the questions are 
about. Although media ownership was discussed earlier as a key criterion to identify 
whether a public diplomacy actor is a state actor or a mediating actor, for citizens who 
are not expert or not specifically sensitive to the issue, ownership of a particular media is 
sometimes difficult to identify and validate.  
But this is not to say that citizens are not sensitive to media ownership, or media 
identification in terms of their information sources or editorial tradition. Previous 
research has showed that citizens tend to develop good psychological relationships with a 
not-locally-funded or operated media, when they have abundant access and perceive the 
source as credible. In these studies, such kind of media are usually labeled as “American 
media” or “Chinese media”, despite whether they receive governmental or public 
funding. This is not against the theoretical proposals in chapter II: it is highly likely that 
ordinary people don’t distinguish mediating state actors (e.g. BBC) and mediators (e.g. 
New York Times). This is because that for ordinary publics, or even for researchers on 
public diplomacy, the linkage between state actors and mediators are often assumed when 
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these two types of actors are in the same country (which means the two are highly inter-
dependent) without much elaboration. After all, most public diplomacy research tends to 
downplay such links to perhaps avoid being politically unwelcomed by the actual public 
diplomacy promoters (see chapter II for a detailed elaboration on “why state actors want 
to operate in camouflage”), and that data relevant to these government-media links are 
more difficult to obtain and validate than public opinion data. 
Lastly, the conceptual differences between foreign and domestic media are 
important determinants of the generalizability of the models tested in the dissertation. It is 
important to know that how “foreign” is differed from “domestic” media can be different 
across countries given the different regulations on media, as well as citizens’ perception 
of what is foreign and domestic. When it comes to international trade and tariffs on 
foreign products, a complex system is used to decide whether a product is foreign or 
domestically made. This system takes a series of factors into consideration, such the 
origin of materials, place of assembly, origin of labor used in the production, the origin of 
the technological patent, the registered location of the manufacturer’s headquarters, etc.  
Thus, considering the complex but effective regulations already established in the 
international trade system to distinguish a foreign product from a domestic product, 
media content or international news faces very different regulations in different places. 
The criteria used in section 3.2 could be extended into a more detailed and more 
generalizable set of regulations determining what is a foreign media, or a foreign 
mediator of public diplomacy. If there is agreement among governments and within 
international organizations about what is “foreign media”, the global trade of ideas could 
be more fluent. Moreover, a common or similar conceptualization of the boundary 
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between foreign and domestic media could facilitate the application of the activation 
model in various national or cultural backgrounds.   
7.3 Controlling Accessibility: Key to Modification 
In the results chapter, Hypotheses 1-6 were tested and confirmed. These 
hypotheses were proposed to illustrate one possible way by which policy makers can 
modify their citizens’ trust in, as well as dependency on, foreign media (i.e. using the 
terms proposed in chapter II: foreign, or non-local, mediating state actors or mediators).  
First of all, support for H1 implies that publics’ perception of the accessibility of 
the media positively influences their perception of media credibility accordingly. Linking 
accessibility to credibility is important, for a media environment where foreign 
information is less controlled, this means that a reduction to the accessibility to foreign 
media could cut short their perceived credibility. Secondly, comparing the coefficient of 
the H1 link and H2 link, there is a noticeable gap between the access-credibility relations 
for foreign and domestic media: in the current Chinese context where access to foreign 
media is technically restricted, such access will contribute more robustly to foreign media 
credibility than what domestic media access can do for domestic media credibility.  
This implies that credibility of domestic media may be subject to the influence of 
a series of other variables, such as trust in social institutions, government and people’s 
own ideological inclination. And in an environment where foreign media access is 
restricted, people rely more on access to form a perception of foreign media credibility.  
H2 hypothesized about the mutual influence between foreign media credibility 
and domestic media credibility. However, it was not supported by data analysis. While 
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conceptually it might be the case that the more credible people perceived foreign media, 
the less credible they perceived domestic media, it is possible that this mutual influence is 
only realistic when the study adopts a relative measurement and conceptualization of 
media credibility: for example, in Zhang et al and Choi et al’ (2002) s study, credibility of 
different types of media are ranked by respondents, which means the more credible some 
types of media, the lower ranks would other media get.  
This finding can be the starting point of a new debate: it is acceptable to assume 
that media usage, or media dependency, or gratification are resource-like concepts, 
meaning that if someone uses media for one purpose for a longer time, then he/she would 
use media for other purposes for less time, because of the total time available for them to 
use media is limited. But, the findings of H2 lead to another question: could media 
credibility be conceptualized as a kind of resource as well?: meaning that credibility 
invested in one media would result in the reduction of credibility in other media. To 
conceptualize media credibility as a resource, and to make such measurement actually 
usable in a questionnaire, the conceptual boundaries between foreign and domestic media 
need to be drawn in the academia, in the industry and, most importantly, among general 
publics: it is only possible for policies hoping to distinguish foreign and domestic media 
to success when the general public knows first what are the differences. 
The findings of H3 support the positive influence of perceived media credibility 
on individual media dependency. The results show that for both foreign and domestic 
media, increased credibility can lead to dependency on such media. This is in accordance 
with the findings in previous literatures.    
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Nevertheless, it is important for the dissertation to stress again that the above-
mentioned model was not tested with the purpose to criticize any policy of any 
government around the world. The Chinese context was chosen because of the author’s 
familiarity with the Chinese context. Similar mechanism is also existent in the United 
States, Russia, and anywhere else on the world: after all, if the adequate boundaries are 
drawn, then in any national context, accessibility to certain types of media organization 
will be different in comparison to those of other types of media. For example, an ordinary 
American citizens’ perceived accessibility to Russian TV, or CCTV America, could be 
lower than the perceived accessibility of CNN or Fox News. Thus, this model is 
conceptualized to suit a wide range of contexts, given the adequate typology of media 
organizations (mediating actors) in any context.  
Thus, the psychological mechanism could be validated in future studies in other 
national or cultural contexts. It is a question for the policy makers whether to exploit such 
mechanism for a firmer control of publics’ relationship-building or not. And this 
dissertation, at the current stage, has no political preference or inclination in terms of 
policy choice. 
7.4 Situational Motivation as Outcome of Relationship with Media 
Chapter IV extends the hypotheses proposed in chapter III to the behavioral 
antecedents of publics. In the current dissertation, this extension is examined in the 
context of Chinese public’s situational motivation to engage in communicative action 
about the problem of air pollution. In other words, chapter IV is interested in knowing if 
dependency on foreign media and domestic media would make the public more likely to 
think air pollution is a social problem, to feel more involved in the problem and to feel 
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less constrained in speaking out about it. Moreover, chapter IV is interested in comparing 
the magnitude of influence on situational motivation by foreign media vs. domestic 
media.  
The result of hypotheses testing in chapter VI showed that dependency on foreign 
or domestic media would have different and sometimes separate effects on people’s 
behavioral intentions for communicative actions about air quality in China. Firstly, for 
H4a and H4b, dependency on foreign media suppresses problem recognition about the 
issue, while dependency on domestic media increase problem recognition. This is an 
interesting finding not in the initial expectations of the dissertation. Considering that for 
Hypotheses 5a and 5b, foreign media again was not significantly related to involvement 
recognition, but domestic media was: it is plausible that attachment to foreign media 
means a detachment from domestic social problems, and thus less problem recognition 
and insignificant involvement recognition. Future studies may further explore the effect 
of foreign media usage or consumption on public’s social involvement level, it is possible 
that dependency on foreign media could increase the perceived distance between the 
media user and his/her social environment, or vice versa. 
In sum, comparing the different effects of foreign media and domestic media on 
Chinese citizens about the air pollution issue, the dissertation finds that foreign media 
could be more directly effective in reducing people’s constraint recognition to speak out 
or act about the issue. At the same time, domestic media seems to be more effective in 
hearten public’s problem recognition and involvement recognition. In a comparatively 
more controlled media environment, foreign media use seems to be associated with the 
perceived distance between the society and the individual. This might be the reason why 
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higher dependency on foreign media lead to a reduced problem recognition, and does not 
encourage involvement recognition.  
Moreover, H6a and H6b showed a different picture: that dependency on foreign 
media decrease publics’ constraint recognition on speaking about the air quality issue in 
China, while dependency on domestic media did not have a significant relationship with 
constraint recognition. This implies that, with the current sample, foreign media and 
domestic media activates the Chinese domestic publics by different mechanisms, foreign 
media activates by leading to a reduced constraint perception, while domestic media 
activates by increasing problem and involvement recognition.  
Another finding of chapter IV is that the total effect of foreign media on 
situational motivation is much less than the total effect from domestic media. This 
potentially means that publics in China are replying predominantly on domestic media to 
understand the issue perceptually. It is interesting that dependency on foreign media did 
not contribute significantly to publics’ problem & involvement recognition about air 
pollution, but dependency on foreign media does explain to a considerable extent why 
Chinese publics are feeling less constrained to speak about the issue.  
Provided a more politically acute topic which would be depicted very differently 
in foreign media and domestic media, the activation effect of foreign media organizations 
could be more significant than domestic media. However, including a politically acute 
topic in a Chinese questionnaire is unrealistic given local legislative settings. Future 
studies can pick a more conflicting topic (between foreign and domestic media) to further 
examine the activation effect of foreign media in another social context. 
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7.5 Media Ownership and Actors in Public Diplomacy 
This dissertation proposed a structural-functionalist conceptual model of public 
diplomacy. In other words, it drew boundaries between different types of actors in public 
diplomacy by identifying their links with the publics and state governments. Two-types 
of links were considered: the first is the ownership-finance link, and the second is their 
interest in other actors (the purpose and motivation of their public diplomatic behavior).  
The new conceptualization is helpful for researchers of transnational persuasion to 
capture some of the new dynamics with which transnational influence is currently being 
performed. One emerging trend is the increased sensitivity of global media platforms to 
government-funded content or operations. This includes CBS accusing RT (Russian TV) 
for being a propaganda machine of the Russian government, as well as the pan-social 
critique in the United States or even the Western world towards the alleged Russian 
political campaign on Facebook and Twitter to influence the 2016 US election. Such 
sensitivity peaked in early 2018 when Youtube, as an Alphabet company (who also owns 
Google), started to “roll out notices below videos uploaded by news broadcasters that 
receive some level of government or public funding”.  
While companies and governments in the United States start to become sensitive 
to transnational persuasion campaigns coming from a foreign-state-funded program or 
organization, governments in other states such as China, were already alert to the 
operation of foreign “mediating actors” targeting their population. Some of these 
mediating actors are state mediating actors (such as Radio Free Asia, Al Hurra, or Voice 
of America, etc.), others are performing mediators (such as the National Endowment for 
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Democracy), while some others are channeling mediators (such as Facebook, Twitter, 
CNN, etc).  
Thus, identifying the ownership of mediating actors is very important for a 
government to come up with a strategy, with which it can assess, monitor, and potentially 
control the effect of transnational persuasion from foreign governments. This controlling 
link between government and foreign mediators was an important part of the general 
model shown in Figure 2.4, and was thus the focus in chapter III and chapter IV for 
further empirical analysis. In conclusion, the theoretical elaboration in chapter II helped 
to illustrate the theoretical assumptions on which hypotheses in chapter III and chapter IV 
are based. These assumptions are also important implications this dissertation hopes to 
bring to the examination and debate within public diplomacy scholarship: 
Implication I: For the public diplomacy scholarship and practice, it may be 
important to answer the question of “Is X not Y?” (distinguish different types of actors in 
public diplomacy) before asking “could X also be Y?” 
Implication II: The differentiation between different actors in public diplomacy 
can be made with consideration of the actors’ interests in other actors in order to function 
or survive (either ownership, mediation, persuasion, information dependency or 
collaboration).  
Implication III: Actors with conflicting interests would have the intention to 
modify their rivals’ relationship with other actors in the context of public diplomacy. 
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Implication IV: There is a necessity to systematically explore possible strategies 
(limiting access, defamation, etc.) with which actors can achieve the above-mentioned 
modifications and evaluate the effectiveness of these strategies. 
Still, the categorization of actors into simply three categories (state actors, 
mediating actors, and publics) means that there would be always more details and 
exceptions to be added into this new conceptualization of public diplomacy. The 
conceptual structural models proposed in chapter II are nevertheless based on the authors’ 
personal experience and knowledge with public diplomacy and transnational persuasion, 
as well as most of the existing literature on public diplomacy, international broadcasting, 
soft power, etc. The field is yet to become a fully explored one with complete theoretical, 
operational and quantified models. Much of the literature usually either favors a political-
science-based conceptualization (favoring organizational actors and formal modeling) or 
a mass-communication-based conceptualization (favoring individual psychometrics). 
This dissertation could be one of the few attempts to combine traditions of thoughts in 
both fields. Although formal modeling about public diplomacy in a political-science-
fashion is yet to come, there are reference points that political scientists can use (Putnam, 
etc.) to build a formal theory about the “why public diplomacy occur” and “is public 
diplomacy really effective” at the macro-level.  
7.6 Theoretical and Geographical Extension 
So far, this dissertation developed a theoretical model of public diplomacy with a 
focus on the structural relationships between different types of actors and their relative 
functions. It then empirically examined a part of the structural relationships in the 
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theoretical model: by proposing and examining a structural equation model of publics 
activation, this dissertation empirically supported: 
• the potential of policy makers to modify foreign mediating actors’ 
relationship with domestic publics by adjusting media accessibility. 
• that domestic publics’ relationship with different types of media can 
increase publics’ situational motivation to speak out about a social 
problem. 
The empirical tests give preliminary support to the new conceptualization of 
public diplomacy illustrated in chapter II. However, not all the structural links shown in 
figure 2.0 (the competition model of public diplomacy) were empirically tested. For 
example, how government collaborates with non-state mediating actors is yet to be fully 
explored and examined with empirical models and real-world data: for example, Jiang 
and Bowen (2011) explored the link between power and ethical decision making in the 
relationships between governments, NGOs and activist groups Also, how performing 
mediators (such as the Olympics committee) interact and collaborates with channeling 
mediators (such as Fcebook, Snapchat or NBC) in the context of public diplomacy is also 
an important part of the theoretical model. For example, the North Korean government 
took the 2018 Winter Olympic Games in South Korea as an opportunity of non-
traditional diplomacy. It would be meaningful to examine how do channeling mediators 
modifies public perception of governmental interaction with performing mediators.  
Moreover, international organizations such as IOC, WTO, UN and IMF are 
categorized as performing mediators in chapter II. However, these international 
organizations can be different in terms of their relationship with individual governments. 
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Indeed, they are international venues where state actions and policies are presented to the 
global audience, but organizations such as the United Nations are also a collection of 
government and may have the same time certain restrictive power on state behavior. If 
powerful international organizations publish negative information about a government’s 
policy, how would such government, as well as other governments, respond in its power 
to modify the effect of such message on global audience? In short, many other links in 
the chapter II are worth future exploration. 
The second possible extension of the current study may be geographical. This is 
to say that the model could be empirically examined in other areas of the world. While 
not necessarily every country or region have governments that regulates foreign media 
content, several places are absolutely of future research interest. For example, the Middle 
East has been a region of ideological realignment and conflict in recent decades, and the 
9-11 tragedy attracted numerous scholars to explore ways to curb anti-Americanism in 
the region. Research has also showed that people in Iraq, Qatar, Egypt and some other 
Middle Eastern countries are aware of the differences between foreign and domestic 
media. The next step would be finding out if these different perceptions lead to different 
media use, exposure, cognition and political or even terrorist behavior. Could government 
control on foreign media accessibility or perception be effective in stabilizing the region 
ideologically? And what does control mean for numerous new-born democracies in terms 
of social construction? Research on media control can definitely help us to better answer 
these questions.  
Research and global public opinion have been anxious about the influence 
brought by new economic powers like China to the existing world order. Even with in 
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American administrative and legislative processes, politicians and academics paid their 
attention to foreign influences in domestic media environment. Many examples, such as 
the RT and Confucius Institute case, were already introduced earlier in the dissertation. It 
is possible that the U.S., being the de facto hegemon currently maintaining world order7, 
could be leading a project to sweep out potential disturbance in a (previously) unified 
global public opinion sphere. This project may be necessary for the reconstruction of Pax 
Americana given the policies laying out by the Trump administration. This dissertation 
responds exactly to the potential competitions between global media, and such 
competitions between media for persuasion and ideological alignment may not be distant 
if we have two or more parallel economic systems in the future: as China builds its Belt 
Road Initiative, some people may at the same time want public opinions along the Belt 
Road Initiative to be akin to Chinese policies and less inclined to Western values8. 
7.7 Level of Analysis of Public Diplomacy: Connecting to Soft Power 
One last, but not the least, important note about the implications of this 
dissertation is about the level of analysis within public diplomacy research. With the 
current conceptual set-up, this dissertation builds theoretical arguments about how 
boundaries help to clarify public diplomatic actors’ interactions in different kinds of 
events. However, boundaries between different actors may not be efficient in explaining 
problems in the conceptualization of soft power. Soft power should definitely not be 
forgotten or ignored in the study of public diplomacy, for policy makers and nation 
                                                 
7 see research on the debate about the superiority of hegemonic and bi-polar world system for more detail 
8 Again, this dissertation does not, and has no intention to research the quality, benevolence or 
disadvantages of either Chinese or Western values: it is important to keep in mind that they are different, 
but differences do not mean a judgement in their nature.  
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leaders around the world are using this concept for statecraft, the word “soft power” was 
also written into the Chinese constitution.  
So how does this dissertation help with future research on soft power? Simply put, 
the current conceptualization of the ecology model or the competition model discussed in 
Chapter II is two-dimensional: after all, it is written on 2D surface in it best effort to 
show the structural differences between actors. Future studies should consider level of 
analysis in public diplomacy studies and practice: with special attention paid to 
relationship-building, image-building, persuasion and activation. When these four levels 
of analysis are taken into consideration, the 2D conceptual model then has a depth to 
better illustrate the different functional links between actors.  
These four levels analysis helps to answer Baldwin (2016)’s question raised 
critically against the concept of soft power (Nye, 1990; 2008). He argued that soft power 
as a concept of power does not have a stable and measurable source. Perhaps it is true 
that Nye has yet answered this question, and political scientists would argue that soft 
power’s source is still largely economic and military, thus it is difficult to separate soft 
power from hard power.  
Maybe it is eloquent that soft power is dependent on hard power, or at least highly 
associated with it, however, it would not difficult to see that their overlap decreases as the 
level of analysis (of public diplomacy) decreases gradually from relationship-building to 
activation. At the highest level of public diplomacy, relationship building can benefit 
from international trade, educational programs, foreign aid, and even war9, but persuasion 
                                                 
9 Japanese Annexation of Korea, Taiwan in the WWII, as well as the recent Iraqi war are examples of how 
wars could be as starting points of relationship building of foreign government with local citizens.  
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and activation are less in the military and economic arena: they usually relate to 
international broadcasting or incitation campaigns, and are more subject to the target 
government’s monitoring and control.  
The highest level of analysis relationship-building is determined by how 
psychologically foreign citizens (e.g. Chinese citizens) feel they are related or connected 
with products, services and policies of a foreign country (e.g. U.S.). It is indeed a kind of 
source of power, and it is also less visible than an aircraft carrier: but it does not mean we 
cannot capture it. Barometers of public opinions are one way to observe the relationship 
resource that a country has overseas.  
The second level image building, relies on the resources (economic, technological 
and cultural) a country has available for promoting favorable views about the 
relationship it has with foreign citizens. For example, European citizens may feel they 
are related to Russia for natural resources (relationship), however, they may still feel 
Russia has a hostile policy about exporting natural resources (image). Also, American 
people may be using Chinese-made products everyday (relationship), yet they would still 
think Made-in-China means poor quality and would prefer not to use Chinese product 
given an alternative (image).  
The third level is persuasion. Even if there are good relationship and images, 
foreign citizens’ cognitive opinion about international affairs and policies are still 
dependent on a government’s ability to communicate with foreign publics, and explain 
issues in frames and agendas of domestic or closely-related global media agencies. This 
has many names: international broadcasting, propaganda, transnational persuasion. But 
no matter how it is named, a government’s ability to speak to the outside is important, for 
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an undisturbed channel of promotion and explanation is key in maximizing the utility of 
relationship and image resource.  
The last level, activation, is reliant on all previous three levels. Activation is 
usually spontaneous and has a target. This means that it is also reliant on the target’s 
ability in gaining and using the previous three types of resources. Activation also requires 
specialized personnel and funding from the acting government and organization: for 
example, activating citizens in North Korea would be way more difficult than doing so in 
Syria, for the North Korean regime may be weak economically, but it has a highly 
institutionalized internal persuasion system, and policy-wise has high relationship with its 
citizens, but in Syria, activation campaigns or incitation campaigns suffer less from 
surveillance and local control.  
7.8 Limitations 
The dissertation is limited in several ways: first, the empirical examinations did 
not cover all the conceptual relationships proposed in chapter II, leaving some of them at 
the theoretical stage without real-world evidence. Secondly, the theoretical scope is 
limited to the author’s experience in public diplomacy, knowledge in international 
relations and perhaps an emphasis on the psychometric aspect of the empirical testing. 
Formal theory building in the field of political science can significantly solidify the 
theoretical foundation. Thirdly, the data collected for empirical examination does not 
come from a national random sampling process in China, and thus should not be 
interpreted as nationally representative, people who reside in less developed or culturally 
diverse areas of China are less represented in the sample. However, the sample does have 
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considerable face validity since it comes from perhaps the main target group of public 
diplomacy: well-educated, mid-aged people who use Internet.  
At a higher level, even the new model for public diplomacy illustrated in chapter 
II should be used with caution. The purpose of chapter II is to draw boundaries between 
actors of public diplomacy, yet, there are two important theoretical limitations of a 
structural-functionalist conceptualization.  
The first is that many of the actors in the model are multiple-goal-oriented rather 
than being motivated by a single goal of public diplomacy. The practice of public 
diplomacy is actually co-orienting the goals of different actors (including the different 
levels of government) for transnational relationship building, situational persuasion and 
feedback-based strategy making. This means that every actor included in model II does 
not exist simply because of public diplomacy. Thus, their behaviors could be subjects to a 
more powerful cause.  
Secondly, the penetration of government agencies into the (perhaps) neutral 
ground of social media undermines the purity of the widely respected, attended and 
studied user-generated content. The boundaries between users and governments are 
definitely diminishing, or perhaps they have never existed since the beginning of social 
media. Drawing boundaries in social media is hard, but for governments such work is 
also necessary, because it would be naïve to assume the absolute benignity of 
cybersphere. 
Then, what comes as a more important topic is how to make ethical decisions 
about these boundaries: drawing boundaries between people can be disastrous, as can be 
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seen from the examples of the Holocaust, Cultural Revolution, Arab Spring, etc. Should 
this be guided by a realist, Machiavellian ethics, or a liberalist, Kantian way of 
justification, or other ways of ethical elaboration? This should be stressed as a void that 
public diplomacy literature needs to fill as soon as possible. Moreover, given the fact that 
chapter III has the need to incorporate relevant concepts and measures from political 
communication literature, the roles played by other psychometric variables such as 
political trust, political efficacy or political participation could be important for a fully 
developed behavioral model. To a certain extent, local regulations in China about 
conducting survey research limited the types of questions that this dissertation can ask: in 
fact, the first item in the conventional measure of media credibility has to be dropped, 
because that item contains the word “manipulate”, and such words are prohibited to be 
asked in a survey in China. This phenomenon is important for scholars who are interested 
in getting survey data from China, and because any items or measures developed using 
English need to be translated, how can researchers preserve as much information as 
possible in their psychometric construct in another language? This question needs to be 
considered for communication scholars trying to get international data.   
Also, the conceptualization of accessibility in the current context, as discussed in 
chapter III, has conceptual overlaps with concepts of selective exposure to media and 
perceived selective control on media. Selective exposure could be a concept which comes 
closer to the actual media use of respondents, and can even be measured on a much 
tangible scale of minutes or hours. Selective control could be closer to public’s 
perception about governmental policy and could be potentially asked in countries where 
 
132 
such questions are allowed. These three concepts (media accessibility, selective exposure 
and selective control) can be used in accordance to the emphasis of a certain research.  
The empirical examinations of this dissertation were performed with the Chinese 
context, this adds to another level of limitation beyond the overlapping nature of 
accessibility, exposure and control. The Chinese context involves dramatic differences 
between foreign and domestic media’s availability and accessibility: however, a 
comparison between foreign media and domestic media’s accessibility could have better 
results if the difference in their accessibility levels was less dramatic. In the Chinese 
context, access to domestic media can hardly be partial among the population targeted by 
this study. In other words, access to Chinese domestic media is usually saturated, and 
such access can be imperative in places where modern communication technology is 
present.  
Thus, what is of most value in this dissertation should be the effect of foreign 
media access on citizen’s activeness. Retrospectively, the competition phenomenon may 
have been adequately modeled by the empirical models: it could be better named as a 
“survival” model of foreign media credibility in a saturated environment of domestic 
media accessibility. When thinking at this level, even the Chinese context starts to lose its 
uniqueness: perhaps it is reasonable for us to assume that foreign media operate with a 
“survival” model in any given national context.  
7.9 Conclusions 
As a final note, this dissertation was written with the sincerest hope that citizens 
around the world can become literate about the fact that “the medium is the message” 
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(McLuhan, 1964), and can possess the ability to think critically about the medium or the 
messages that may guide their perceptions and behaviors. As of 2018, we are all living in 
an era of unprecedented globalization, cultural integration, and global ideological re-
alignment. But, it is also an era of high uncertainty because of the regionalist and 
protectionist policy-making in various governments around the world.  
With new considerations on how information was and is being created, packaged 
and distributed around the world, it is the responsibility of policy makers, media workers 
and publics around the world to prevent cultural and political extremism, which can 
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APPENDIX A: DISSERTATION QUESTIONNAIRE 
Informed Consent 
Thank you for taking the time to respond to this survey. The purpose of this study is to understand Chinese 
people’s use and understanding of foreign and domestic media, and thus to provide suggestions about how 
to further construct a benign media and public opinion environment.  
Your participation in this study is confidential and no identifying information will be collected. Only the 
researchers can have access to the data. The online host (Baidu MTC) uses several forms of encryption for 
data protection, thus there is a minimal risk that security of any online data may be breached. 
If you have any questions about the research, please contact the principal investigator Yicheng Zhu at the 
University of South Carolina at yicheng@email.sc.edu. The survey will take approximately 10 minutes to 
complete. Your participation in this survey is completely voluntary. You can end your participation at any 
time by leaving the survey web site.  
Agreement: 
I have read the procedure described above. I voluntarily agree to participate in the procedure and I have 
received a copy of this description. 









Block Zero: Intro 
Before answering the survey, please allow me to familiarize you with the 
background of the study and two key concepts that will be used in the survey.  
Firstly,  
all the questions, except for “media dependency questions”, are related to news 
about air pollution in China, please keep this in mind when you are answering the 
questions. 
Secondly,  
By foreign media, it refers to professional news media organizations, or any 
representative product of them, that are headquartered or funded outside of China (such 
as New York Times, BBC, CNN, AP, Asahi Shinbum, etc).  
By domestic media, it refers to professional news media organizations, or any 
representative product of them, that are headquartered or funded inside of China (such 
as CCTV, People’s Daily, Xinhua, CPRadio, etc.) 
Any news media or media products based or funded in Hong Kong SAR of 
PRC, Macau SAR of PRC or Taiwan province should not be taken into consideration 
while answering this survey. 
Block I: Perceived Foreign Media Accessibility 
Assume that you are looking for news about air pollution in China, please 
rank the following items according to how credible you think they are. 
General 1. It is easy for me to access foreign online news media 
2. my social environment facilitates me to access foreign 
online news media 
3. people around me usually have access to foreign online 
news media 






Block II: Perceived Domestic Media Accessibility 
Assume that you are looking for news about air pollution in China, please 
rank the following items according to how credible you think they are. 
General 1. It is easy for me to access domestic online news media 
2. my social environment facilitates me to access domestic 
online news media 
3. people around me usually have access to domestic online 
news media 
4. domestic online news media contents are readily available 
in my life 
  
 
Block III: Perceived Foreign Media Credibility 
Assume that you are looking for news about air pollution in China, To 
what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
Believability 1. foreign media orgs don’t try to manipulate public 
opinion (Censored and Not Asked) 
2. foreign media orgs get facts accurately. (FM Believe1) 
3. foreign media orgs deal fairly with all sides of 
political or social issue. (FM Believe2) 
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4. foreign media orgs separate facts from opinions. (FM 
Believe3) 
5. foreign media orgs is generally not biased. (FM 
Believe4) 
  
Affinity 1. foreign media orgs are concerned with my 
community’s well-being 
2. foreign media orgs watch out for my interests 
3. foreign media orgs are concerned about the public 
welfare for my people 
4. foreign media orgs report socially meaningful stories 




Block IV: Perceived Domestic Media Credibility 
Assume that you are looking for news about air pollution in China, To 
what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
Believability 1. domestic media orgs don’t try to manipulate public 
opinion (Not asked-censored) 




3. domestic media orgs deal fairly with all sides of 
political or social issue. (DM Believe2) 
4. domestic media orgs separate facts from opinions. 
(DM Believe3) 
5. domestic media orgs is generally not biased. (DM 
Believe4) 
  
Affinity 1. domestic media orgs are concerned with my 
community’s well-being 
2. domestic media orgs watch out for my interests 
3. domestic media orgs are concerned about the public 
welfare for my people 
4. domestic media orgs report socially meaningful stories 




Block V Foreign Media Dependency: 
For the following things, to what extent do you rely on foreign media? 
Gain insight into why you do some of the things you do 
Observe how others cope with problems or situations like yours 
Keep up with world events 
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Stay on top of what is happening in the community 
Imagine what you'll be like when you grow older 
Find out how the country is doing 
Decide where to go for services such as health, financial, or household 
Figure out what to buy 
Plan where to go for evening and weekend activities 
Discover better ways to communicate with others 
Think about how to act with friends, relatives, or people you work with 
Get ideas about how to approach others in important or difficult situations 
Unwind after a hard day or week 
Relax when you are by yourself 
Have something to do when nobody else is around 
Give you something to do with your friends 
Have fun with family or friends 
Be a part of events you enjoy without having to be there 
 
Block VI Domestic Media Dependency: 
For the following things, to what extent do you rely on domestic media? 
1. Gain insight into why you do some of the things you do 
2. Observe how others cope with problems or situations like yours 
3. Keep up with world events 
4. Stay on top of what is happening in the community 
5. Imagine what you'll be like when you grow older 
6. Find out how the country is doing 
7. Decide where to go for services such as health, financial, or household 
8. Figure out what to buy 
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9. Plan where to go for evening and weekend activities 
10. Discover better ways to communicate with others 
11. Think about how to act with friends, relatives, or people you work with 
12. Get ideas about how to approach others in important or difficult situations 
13. Unwind after a hard day or week 
14. Relax when you are by yourself 
15. Have something to do when nobody else is around 
16. Give you something to do with your friends 
17. Have fun with family or friends 
18. Be a part of events you enjoy without having to be there 
 
Block VII: Variables from STOPS model (Public Relations) 
Problem Recognition: 
I think air pollution is a serious social (or national) problem. 
I am concerned about air pollution a lot. 
About air pollution, I see a huge gap between what it should be and what it is 
now. 
The news related to air pollution surprised me a lot. 
Something needs to be done to improve air pollution. 
 
Constraint Recognition (all reversed as suggested by Kim & Grunig 2011): 
I am not afraid to take action to make changes for air pollution 
I can make difference and improvement regarding air pollution. 
I find no obstacles in doing something for air pollution. 
I feel I can improve the problematic situation of air pollution. 





I realized a strong connection between air pollution and me. 
Air pollution affects my life. 
Air pollution has serious consequences for my life and someone I care. 
I am connected with air pollution and its consequences.  
I think air pollution could affect me personally. 
 
 
Block VIII Demographics: 
In which year you were born? (Four-digit Arabic Numbers Only, example: 1980) 
What is your highest level of education? – custom answers 
What type of hukou are you registered with? 1- Metropolitan 2-Agricultural 
In which type of area are you mainly living? (censored, not asked) 
1- Metropolitan areas (dushi) 
2- Provincial Capitals (shi) 
3- 3rd -4th level municipals (xian, zhen) 
4- Rural area (xiang, cun) 
5- Other: specify 
Are you currently a civil servant? (censored, not asked) 
1- Yes 
2- No 

































































































































○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
 
 

























○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
海 外 媒 体 区 分
“事实”和“意
见” 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
海外媒体基本上
不带偏见 



























○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
国 内 媒 体 区 分
“事实”和“意
见” 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
国内媒体基本上
不带偏见 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
 
 





















○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
海外媒体留心和
我利益相关的事 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
海外媒体关心人
民的公众福利 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
海外媒体报道有
社会意义的新闻 


























○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
国内媒体留心和
我利益相关的事 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
国内媒体关心公
众福利 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
国内媒体报道有
社会意义的新闻 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
国内媒体听取普
通中国人的声音 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
 
 


















   理解您为
什么会做一些您
平时做的事 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
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   想象您年
龄变大后会如何 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 




○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
   了解社区
／社会上发生了
什么 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
   了解自己
国家的状况 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
   了解世界
上的事件 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 




○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
   决定买什
么东西 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
   计划晚上
或者周末去哪里
活动 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
   发现更好
的与他人沟通的
办法 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
   思考如何
与朋友，亲戚或
者同事打交道 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
   知晓如何
在重要或者困难





   在劳累的
一天后放松 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
   在独自一
人的时候放松 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
   在独自一
人的时候找点事
做 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
   在与朋友
一起时找点事做 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
   和家人或
朋友一起开心 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 




○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
 
 


















   理解您为
什么会做一些您
平时做的事 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
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   想象您年
龄变大后会如何 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 




○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
   了解社区
／社会上发生了
什么 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
   了解自己
国家的状况 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
   了解世界
上的事件 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 




○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
   决定买什
么东西 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
   计划晚上
或者周末去哪里
活动 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
   发现更好
的与他人沟通的
办法 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
   思考如何
与朋友，亲戚或
者同事打交道 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
   知晓如何
在重要或者困难





   在劳累的
一天后放松 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
   在独自一
人的时候放松 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
   在独自一
人的时候找点事
做 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
   在与朋友
一起时找点事做 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
   和家人或
朋友一起开心 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 




○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
 
 





















○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
我非常关心这一
问题 







○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
关于这个问题的
新闻让我很惊讶 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
必须做些什么来
改善这个问题 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
 
 























○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
没什么妨碍我为
这个问题做些事 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
我可以改善这个
麻烦的局面 



























○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
这个问题对我的
生活有影响 




○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
我和这个问题以
及它的后果相连 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
这个问题可能影
响到我个人 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
 
 







12. 您何时出生？ [填空题] * 
 
  _________________________________ 
 






   ○ 小学 
   ○ 初高中 
   ○ 本科/专科 
   ○ 硕士 
   ○ 博士 
 
14. 请选择城市: [填空题] 
 
  _________________________________ 
 
15. 您是公务员或者在事业单位上班吗？ [单选题] * 
   ○ 是 
   ○ 不是 
 
 
